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Abstract
One of the most important concepts of modern commercial speech
related to advertising, characterized as the “Powellian balance,” resulted in
a compromise between those who thought commercial expression should
receive little or no First Amendment protection and those who argued that
it receive the same expansive protection accorded to political expression.
The private papers of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. reveal the remarkable
degree to which he maintained a deep commitment to balancing competing
interests in shaping the commercial speech doctrine. The central argument
of this monograph is that Powell’s “middle way” can be employed to best
promote today’s vital and complex societal interests.
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efore Lewis F. Powell, Jr. could use “Justice” before his name,
the corporate attorney wrote an opinion for the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce that was a virtual battle cry for maximizing busi-
ness clout in the media and in the courts. Those who read the
once secret and widely influential memorandum were later
surprised in the early spring of 1980 when Justice Powell
wrote the majority opinion in the most important commercial speech case
to that time or since—most anticipated a ruling more unequivocally advan-
tageous to business interests.
After a decade on the Court, Justice Powell had seven justices who had
expressed support in conference for striking down the advertising regula-
tion that had been challenged in the case on First Amendment grounds.
Quite arguably, he could have found a way to do not only that but to do so
in a manner that would have placed commercial speech on equal footing
with the broader constitutional protections of political speech — or at least
something much closer. Indeed, he could have sought to sweep away the
doctrinal distinctions the Court had long maintained that kept commercial
advertising relatively less protected from regulation by the First
Amendment.
Instead, Justice Powell poured considerable labors into firmly and
enduringly embedding those distinctions in the case law while paradoxical-
ly, to many, doing much the same thing to promote broad protections for
commercial speech. Furthermore, based on what the historical record
reveals of his intentions, he pulled it off. In doing so he hammered into
place a challenging, often maddening, and much challenged judicial tool for
maintaining balance between two fiercely competing societal interests. The
first time Justice Powell employed it, he himself found it agonizing to apply
in practice. Many scholars and jurists have argued since that it is too diffi-
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cult, inconsistent, ineffective, and so on. Yet well into the twenty-first cen-
tury, Justice Powell’s creation endures. In terms of societal interests, this
monograph proposes that it is a good thing that it does.
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Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Used by permission from the Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives,
Washington and Lee University School of Law
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Introduction
It is almost a half-century since the development of the modern First
Amendment doctrine on commercial speech that began in the United States
Supreme Court. It is now possible to place the considerable changes
wrought by that process in fuller theoretical and historical context. The cen-
tral argument of this monograph is that the contentious debate over the
Court’s jurisprudence regarding constitutional protection for advertising
can be moved forward through enhanced understanding of its anchoring in
broader, time-tested wisdom on how to best promote vital but complex soci-
etal interests. Such an understanding offers considerable ground for resolu-
tion between the divided camps of scholars who argue, often ideologically,
either that commercial expression should receive little or no First
Amendment protection, or that it should receive the same expansive protec-
tion accorded to political expression and thus be essentially unburdened
from any regulation. Considering the subject in context to a long view of
human experience advances significant support for historically grounded
principles of sound business law and practice over ideology, principles that
stand in contrast to the hazards of ideologically driven imbalance in eco-
nomic affairs more broadly.
Advancing an understanding in favor of what is characterized here as
“Powellian balance” will begin with a synthesis of the voluminous litera-
ture on commercial speech, utilizing an explicative spectrum of values
between the freedom of the informational component of advertising on one
end and the preservation of the fair-bargaining process implicated in the
contractual component of such speech at the other. The tension of that dual-
istic conflict established, the monograph would articulate how the theoret-
ical centrality of that difficult but vital equilibrium of values has been main-
tained in modern commercial speech jurisprudence for more than three
decades.
The influence of Powell’s compromise will be demonstrated through
analysis focused upon development of its formative cases as documented in
the private papers of one of the most influential justices involved in the
process. Those papers reveal the remarkable degree to which Justice Lewis
F. Powell, Jr. — whose career background and well-documented agenda
before joining the Supreme Court arguably made him the most experiental-
ly business-oriented justice there in recent decades — maintained a deep
commitment to balancing competing interests in shaping the commercial
speech doctrine. That effort markedly strove to resist tilting the related body
of jurisprudence excessively out of balance in either direction. That is, the
process resulted in establishing a structural mechanism that serves to pre-
serve an adjudicational focal point that always remains, over time, some-
where between absolute freedom of the informational component of adver-
tising and excessively suppressive enforcement of the fair-bargaining
process implicated in the contractual component of such speech. Justice
Powell’s deep background in historically grounded principles of sound
business law, experience, and practice guided his creative and tenacious
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judicial assertion of his own unwavering commitment toward maintaining
that fundamental balance. And it is precisely that balance that Justice
Powell intended to — and did — institutionalize in constitutional consider-
ations of First Amendment questions concerning commercial speech ever
since. As will be articulated, the fact that it has produced what on the sur-
face may seem contradictory rulings represents not the failure of Powellian
balance but rather its ongoing success.
In broad strokes, the Supreme Court’s doctrine on First Amendment
protection for commercial speech can be bracketed reasonably distinctly in
terms of three historical phases.1 In the first, the Court devoted little atten-
tion to the subject, and when it did, declared advertising to be a form of
expression existing somewhere well outside the shelter of constitutional
protections for freedom of speech. That approach ended in the 1970s when
the Court over a series of cases spanning the decade made commercial
speech a priority in its First Amendment cases and established an interme-
diate level of protection for advertising. The ruling meant that judicial
review of challenged regulations of commercial speech be conducted at a
level of scrutiny between high, applied to regulation of political expression
and low, applied to regulations that do not infringe upon fundamental
rights.2
The central case is the Court’s decision in Central Hudson Gas and
Electric v. Public Service Commission3 in which Justice Powell developed a
four-part test for assessing the constitutionality of government regulations
on advertising that are challenged on First Amendment grounds.4 While the
second phase cannot truly be said to have ended — given that the Hudson
test remains central to the Court’s commercial speech doctrine — a relative-
ly more rigorous evolution of that test’s application can be seen in a third
level that evolved significantly in the early 1990s. The major commercial
speech cases since can be distinguished by an unsparing determination to
deny government the power to intervene in advertising that disseminates
truthful information — even for the purpose of discouraging consumption
of legal but socially problematic products such as alcohol and tobacco.5
As will be discussed, the Court’s development on this issue generated
ongoing debate in the literature and among justices over the degree of First
Amendment protection that should be accorded to commercial speech. This
monograph considers that debate in terms of the inherent difficulties in
assessing expression that not only talks about a product or service, but also
sells it. In that respect, advertising has been characterized as “speech in the
service of selling.”6 The problem involved can be conceptualized more fully
by considering commercial speech as a form of expression that inherently
comprises both informational and contractual elements. That is, to the
extent that an advertisement serves an informative function, it represents
the sort of expression that the First Amendment protects. But to the extent
that it makes promises to potential buyers, it “can be seen as constituting
part of the contractual arrangement between the buyer and seller.” As such,
advertising is subject to different considerations, since “[c]ontract law con-
sists almost entirely of rules attaching liability to various uses of language,”
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as Farber has observed, and “the use of language to form contracts is not the
sort of ‘speech’ to which the First Amendment applies.”7
This monograph comprises an array of “bold, and boldly conflicting,
solutions to the question of what judicial protection is appropriate to com-
mercial speech,” as Cass put it in an influential 1988 article.8 He wrote at a
time when most of the Supreme Court’s commercial speech rulings reflect-
ed a relatively higher degree of agreement among the justices than would be
the case later.9 In short, as will be discussed in more detail, the spectrum of
those solutions ranges from granting commercial speech the same First
Amendment protections as political speech to granting it none of those pro-
tections — along with a number of proposals for various intermediate pro-
tections.
Cass’s assessment of the literature concluded that the “general contours
of the Court’s commercial speech decisions are in keeping with history,
precedent, and sound analysis, while strong objections to these decisions
often rest on less easily defended views of constitutional interpretation gen-
erally and of the First Amendment in particular.”10 The purpose of this
monograph is to extend analysis grounded in that vein so as to consider the
degree to which the formative years of the Court’s modern commercial
speech jurisprudence reflect philosophical consistency with historically
grounded principles of sound business law, experience, and practice. That
objective will be advanced through an assessment of the literature.
That section will be followed by analysis of development of the forma-
tive cases of modern commercial speech jurisprudence, as documented in
the private papers of the justice whose extensive efforts in shaping those
cases established the most enduring influence upon the Court’s ongoing
doctrine concerning advertising and the First Amendment. Justice Powell,
who died in 1988, came to the Court in 1972 as part of a well-documented
and historically significant effort to expand the influence of business on the
Court and in the media — an effort he was instrumental in launching.11
Justice Powell brought considerable personal experience in the business
community to the Court, joining it at the age of sixty-four after a long career
as one of the nation’s most successful corporate attorneys, which included
serving on the boards of directors of a number of large companies.12 He
joined the Court as one of four new justices appointed by President Richard
M. Nixon, with the goal of remaking it in reaction to what the president saw
as the “adventurous egalitarianism” it had pursued under Chief Justice Earl
Warren over the previous two decades.13
Through historical and legal analysis of the relevant memoranda, cor-
respondence, and other documents in his private Court papers, this study
employs a methodological approach that offers insights beyond what is
available in published rulings of the Court. The extensive files that Justice
Powell kept offer researchers a window into the way interactions involving
him and his fellow justices critically shaped the nature of a series of ground-
breaking rulings. That view provides a remarkably full, detailed, and
nuanced understanding of how one determined justice overcame consider-
able challenges over the course of the robust debate at the Court during the
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nascent years of the modern commercial speech doctrine’s development.
Ultimately he firmly secured a doctrinal framework consistent with the
philosophical and experiental cornerstones of his own most fundamental
convictions on how to best promote vital but complex societal interests.
The Literature and its Informational/
Contractual Divide
As proposed in the introduction, this monograph considers the litera-
ture on commercial speech within a framework of the dualistic information-
al/contractual nature of that form of expression. That is, it seeks under-
standing through scholarly research that promotes the informational or con-
tractual element or a middle way. Broadly, an emphasis on the information-
al element represents commercial speech in terms of an abstract freedom of
expression. Conversely, an emphasis on the contractual element conceptu-
alizes commercial speech within the area of transactional promises between
the seller and buyer that are not First Amendment concerns.
One of the earliest arguments of the latter can be seen in Jackson and
Jeffries’ assertion that while “disallowing state interference with commer-
cial advertising serves other values that merit careful legislative considera-
tion — aggregate economic efficiency and consumer opportunity to maxi-
mize utility in a free market — these values are not appropriate for judicial
vindication under the First Amendment.”14 Also early in the Supreme
Court’s development of its modern commercial speech doctrine, Coase put
forth the counter-position with similar prominence contending that “once
the informational value of price advertising is recognized, it seems difficult
to deny all value to the advertising of other qualities,” and by that reason-
ing such expression warrants expansive First Amendment protection.15
Thus, those two perspectives offer representations that can serve to approx-
imate the extremes of literature on commercial speech related to advertising
in the last four decades.
Those perimeters can be distinguished more fully in the considerable
scholarship of Baker and Redish. Baker stressed his analysis that historical-
ly, “Our strongest advocates of free speech” — such as political theorist John
Stuart Mill, Justice Hugo Black, and civil liberties scholar Thomas Emerson
— “each consistently rejected granting any protection to commercial
speech…. [None] saw freedom of speech as about, or as including, a busi-
ness’s speech promoting its sales and profits.”16 While the early cases such
as Virginia Pharmacy “churned sympathy as essentially consumer protec-
tion cases,”17 Baker pointed out, “subsequent popular advocacy of constitu-
tional protection for commercial speech has been powerfully promoted by
corporate interests — from groups such as the American Association of
Advertising Agencies.”18 In contrast, Redish focused on an articulation of
marketplace-of-ideas theory that is framed in terms of listeners freely receiv-
ing information to “supply ... theoretical support” for “the extension of full
First Amendment protection to commercial speech.”19 In his view, most of
the opposition to extending such protection undermines freedom of expres-
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sion because it “may be deconstructed into little more than a result-orient-
ed attempt to stifle advocacy of a particular ideological perspective or point
of view. The First Amendment guarantee cannot be allowed to be manipu-
lated in such a manner.”20
Baker counters the viewpoint-discrimination contention by noting that
regulations on commercial speech actually do not restrict any particular
viewpoint that is not part of messages that represent potential commercial
transactions with consumers: “Any regulation of commercial speech leaves
people on all sides of the world-wide debate completely free to present their
views and their understanding of the facts” outside that context.21 Redish
articulated the essence of their differences in terms that delineate their
respective positions in relation to the informational/contractual divide. It
“flows from our respective beliefs concerning the relevance for First
Amendment purposes of the receipt, as opposed to merely the expression,
of information, opinion, and thought,” he wrote. Because “the value of self-
realization, as I define it, may be fostered as much by the receipt of expres-
sion as by the act of expressing, I conclude that the source or motivation of
the expression is largely irrelevant.”22
The early years of the modern commercial speech doctrine generated
an impressive body of work roughly along the lines of that spectrum. It
made the case that the Supreme Court was correct in maintaining a subor-
dinate status for commercial speech in First Amendment jurisprudence,23
disparaged the Court’s efforts to continue distinctions between commercial
and noncommercial speech in that jurisprudence,24 and advanced argu-
ments for approaching the question along a middle ground between the first
two camps.25 Subsequently, the Court issued rulings that struck down regu-
lations on the advertising of alcohol and tobacco — products that were legal
for adults but nevertheless implicated in such serious health concerns that
regulation of their promotion had long been thought well within the bounds
of the government’s purview.26 The decisions suggested a shift toward an
assessment of advertising as purely informational and thus worthy of
greater First Amendment protections, generating a vein of scholarship that
asserted the Court had announced the “last call” for maintaining “the unten-
able distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech.”27
To many, the Court appeared so poised to leap that it seemed to justify
rhapsodizing that its “love affair ... [had] ended” with the complex balanc-
ing the Central Hudson test had maintained between the informational and
contractual elements of advertising.28 Certainly, as Sullivan expressed it,
such rulings raised questions that made it “unclear why ‘commercial
speech’ should continue to be treated as a separate category of speech iso-
lated from general First Amendment principles.”29 Minimally, the trend
seemed to be “toward, although still shy of, affording commercial speech
the same level of protection other forms of protected speech enjoy.”30
Warnings ensued that protected such forms of advertising actually promot-
ed subtler forms of deception through which products such as cigarettes and
alcohol “are selling the addict’s solution, telling us that our problems can be
effortlessly solved by the purchase of a product, ... [when] even marketers
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016jmo.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
themselves know that things like relationships, self-esteem, and love cannot
be provided by a product…. In this respect, deception is as integral a part of
commercial advertising as it is of addiction.”31
For Piety, that represented an early assertion of the broader question
she would examine extensively in the years ahead, exploring whether such
an expansive “architecture of the First Amendment with respect to commer-
cial speech is one we can afford to live with.”32 Other scholarship has sim-
ilarly focused upon the evolving nature of modern advertising as a subtler
and more pervasive form of deceptiveness that arguably serves to under-
mine consideration of the contractual element in the Court’s evolving
jurisprudence on commercial speech. In a pair of articles from that period,
Collins and Skover considered at some length the way that “today’s mass
advertising often has ... less to do with facts than image” and thus can be
understood as “more a total cultural system than an exclusively informa-
tional one ... [in which] truth is that which sells.”33 In that milieu they
maintained constitutional protection for such expression is effectively
advancing “talismanically” through a process that “appropriates the sym-
bols of informational advertising, reconstructs them in its own image, and
returns them to the legal community in the form of constitutional defenses,”
institutionalizing in the case law “an ignoble lie.”34
The next decade saw a considerable burst of related literature inspired
by a Supreme Court ruling that never happened. Even though the Court had
agreed to hear 2003’s Nike, Inc. v. Kasky,35 accepted a total of thirty-four
briefs from the parties involved and amici (friend of the court), and heard
oral arguments, it ultimately decided not to decide the case.36 That non-call
left in place a California Supreme Court ruling that the messages in a pub-
lic relations and advertising campaign by Nike, Inc., were subject to regula-
tion under California’s commercial speech laws and could proceed to trial.37
A concurring opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens and joined by two other
justices attributed the dismissal to procedural problems that would make
adjudication by the high Court premature.38 Justice Stephen Breyer chal-
lenged that reasoning and was joined by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.39
Activist Mark Kasky had sued Nike over its campaign alleging that it made
false and misleading statements regarding so-called unsafe and abusive
working conditions in factories where the multinational corporation’s ath-
letic shoes and apparel were manufactured.40 As its defense, Nike argued
that the campaign was protected as political speech on a subject of public
debate — and thus not subject to any regulation on its commercial speech.
However, when that argument was not successful, the case was settled out
of court.41 Nike agreed to pay $1.5 million to the Fair Labor Association, a
Washington-based group that monitors corporate labor practices abroad and
helps educate workers.42 Kasky and Nike said in a joint statement that sup-
porting such programs was preferable to continued litigation.43 That ended
the litigation, but not by any means the scholarly debate.
One line of argument asserted that the difficult questions presented by
the Nike case demonstrated that the Supreme Court should stop trying to
maintain a line between commercial and noncommercial speech in its First
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Amendment jurisprudence. “[T]he line is so blurred as to be indistinguish-
able. With greater frequency and subtlety, new technologies and innovative
marketing strategies introduce corporate profit-motive into what otherwise
would be fully protected speech. The current commercial speech doctrine
cannot predictably resolve disputes resulting from these new modes of
expression,” La Fetra contended.44 “Even when the speech is fairly straight-
forward in its attempt to bolster the bottom line, it is so frequently intermin-
gled with otherwise protected speech that courts simply cannot determine
where the speech falls in the tangled web of cases comprising the ‘commer-
cial speech doctrine.’”45 For Terilli, Nike “demonstrated the danger as well
as the difficulty of trying to distinguish commercial speech from other
speech,”46 and he proposed that commercial speech should be fully protect-
ed unless it includes a “consummated, proposed or intended transaction to
which an actual injury could be attributed.”47 Johnson and Fisher essayed
similarly that commercial speech should be narrowly defined on the basis
of a standard limited to “statements made in the course of economic trans-
actions.”48 Rather than seeking to hold business corporations to “a higher
standard of truthfulness in all of their public communications on subjects
that might influence consumers,” the purpose of the commercial speech
doctrine should be “merely to allow the government to ensure that con-
sumers are accurately informed about products and services in the market-
place.”49
Such calls for narrowing the reach of commercial speech jurisprudence
were countered by scholarship that argued the case showed instead that
complex, new advertising methods called for an opposite approach.
Maintaining that the courts involved had rightly denied granting the corpo-
ration a “constitutional right to lie,” Piety catalogued the implications of
protecting more broadly speech such as that at issue in Nike, in which the
lawsuit “didn’t just allege that Nike had disseminated false information”
but that “Nike had intentionally disseminated false information.”50 In an
article that focused on the linkage between regulatory enforcement efforts
such as Kasky’s and the prevention of actual harms that may be deceptive-
ly represented in commercial speech, Fisher contended that Nike-style law-
suits offer some potential for constructively influencing corporate labor
practices.51 Bennigson argued that “all speech by publicly traded for-profit
business corporations is commercial” and thus the answer to questions pre-
sented by such cases as Nike should be simply to classify all speech by com-
mercial corporations as commercial speech, without regard to its content.52
In a cautionary note regarding such assertions to shift commercial speech
jurisprudence so far in that direction, Collins and Skover warned that the
ruling against Nike potentially could well cut just as deeply against those
who saw it as a means to force corporations to be more truthful, arguing that
the messages of consumer advocates could be vulnerable to litigation chal-
lenging its veracity.53
More recent works highlight the expansive range of efforts to push for
evolving commercial speech jurisprudence so as consider more types of
speech as informational and bring them within the protection of the First
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Amendment. Page has proposed, for example, that communications
between publicly traded companies and their current and prospective
investors should qualify, contending there is “little, if any, justification for
securities regulations that restrict or burden speech.”54 Erickson argued for
extending such protection to counter recent regulations on telemarketing
and junk-faxes, maintaining that “[t]o make the householder the exclusive
and final judge of what will cross his threshold undoubtedly has the effect
of impeding the flow of ideas, information, and arguments that, ideally, he
should receive and consider.”55 Conversely, arguments for taking the com-
mercial speech doctrine in the other direction have made the case for adapt-
ing it so as to allow for more restrictive regulation of such recently prolifer-
ating practices as junk-food advertising to children,56 “undercover-market-
ing” techniques,57 and brand-sponsored “peer promotions.”58 More broadly,
Piety’s analysis of the modern metamorphosis through which corporate
marketing has moved away from the explicit claims of traditional advertis-
ing to public relations techniques — which advance the same commercial
objectives but are more difficult and often impossible to test for truth in
terms of the current commercial speech doctrine — made the case for a doc-
trine that protects less of such expression as informational, rather than
more.59 She concluded that in response the doctrine must evolve so as to
more broadly hold “entities seeking to profit from information injected into
the stream of commerce ... accountable for the quality of that information.”60
The Literature and the Overriding Weight of Case Law
In order to most fully place the body of literature on modern commer-
cial speech jurisprudence in perspective, it is vital to emphasize that the
most enduring constant over the greatest part of its development is the con-
tinued reliance on the Central Hudson test and its structural role in main-
taining an intermediate level of protection for commercial speech. Even in
more recent commercial speech cases in which some justices have ques-
tioned that central component of the doctrine and suggested treating such
expression more like political speech, the Court’s majority has never
embraced such a shift. Revisions of the doctrine have over time proven more
accurately to focus on preventing government from denying citizens truth-
ful information disseminated via advertising, especially when the regula-
tion involves using speech restrictions to discourage activities that are oth-
erwise legal.61
Yet, the centrality and essential relevance of the Central Hudson test in
commercial speech jurisprudence remains intact, despite much critique in
the literature.62 Indeed, its vitality can be seen in the way that the repeated
efforts of some justices have failed to win a majority at the Court. For exam-
ple, in a concurring opinion in 1993’s Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
which struck down a city ban on the use of newsracks on city streets to dis-
tribute commercial handbills, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote that he
hoped the Court would ultimately “abandon Central Hudson’s analysis
entirely.”63 In the Court’s splintered 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island,64 a six-
justice majority agreed on the judgment striking down two Rhode Island
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statutes limiting advertisement of alcohol prices to the point of purchase,
but the nine justices split into five alignments with varied memberships of
three or four justices each to join selected parts of Justice Stevens’ eight-part
principal opinion.65 Two other justices joined his argument that more rigor-
ous scrutiny than Central Hudson’s intermediate inspection should be
applied to regulations that entirely prohibit “the dissemination of truthful,
nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preserva-
tion of a fair bargaining process.”66 But four other justices specifically reject-
ed any such refashioning of established doctrine.67
Therefore, the Central Hudson test remains the standard for determin-
ing through intermediate scrutiny the constitutionality of advertising regu-
lations that are challenged on First Amendment grounds. It is quite routine-
ly employed in the courts for that purpose, including in prominent recent
cases as the basis for upholding regulation on commercial speech such as
“do not call” restrictions on telemarketing68 and lottery advertising,69 and
for striking down regulations on advertising involving alcohol content70 and
prices71 and tobacco billboards.72 In 2001’s Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, the
petitioners urged the Court to “reject the Central Hudson analysis and apply
strict scrutiny” on the grounds that several justices had “expressed doubts
about the Central Hudson analysis and whether it should apply in certain
cases.73 The majority firmly declined — just as it had in response to a sim-
ilar case two years before: “We see ‘no need to break new ground. Central
Hudson, as applied in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides
an adequate basis for decision.’”74
The Hudson-Centric Doctrine’s Principled Grounding
This monograph will now proceed with developing the argument that
considerable explanation for the longevity of that Hudson-centric doctrine
can be seen in the philosophical resonance with historically grounded prin-
ciples of sound business law, experience, and practice deriving from the pri-
orities of the Powell Era Court.75 In particular, those priorities can be seen
to maintain a fundamental commitment to the difficult balancing between
the values of freedom of expression and the fair-bargaining process. Stern
has characterized the commercial speech jurisprudence forged in that era
and essentially maintained by the Court since as representing “a healthy
pragmatism, not jurisprudential failure…. The Court has developed a flexi-
ble but coherent method of identifying commercial speech commensurate
with the complexity of the subject and the needs of a still-evolving First
Amendment doctrine.”76 Because that “framework can accommodate the
protection sought by all but the most zealous champions of expression plau-
sibly denominated as commercial speech,” it substantiates “the affirmative
value of this imperfectly defined category of expression.”77 Vladeck’s more
recent assessment holds that the “basic truth about the commercial speech
doctrine is that it was crafted as a pragmatic solution to the complicated
problem of how to open the door to truthful communications between sell-
ers and prospective purchasers while continuing to shield prospective pur-
chasers from falsehoods and half-truths that distort the market.”78 While the
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Central Hudson test has “not served that goal perfectly,” it has served it well
enough that “the doctrine is criticized far more for its theoretical failings
than for the results it produces, ... [which] have been generally predictable
and broadly approved.”79
Schauer proposed that the effectiveness of the Hudson-centric doctrine
is grounded in a deeper truth that rejects arguments based on fallacious
notions that “a distinction that cannot be sharply drawn cannot be drawn at
all,” a contention that “betrays most of our linguistic life, a life in which we
readily distinguish night from day, frogs from tadpoles, short from tall, fat
from thin, old from young, and rich from poor without feeling that the lack
of a clear line of demarcation ... renders the distinction incoherent.”80 While
readily conceding “that the processes of talking and of adjudication are dif-
ferent,” he insisted that “once we see that difficulties in drawing lines are
not an insuperable barrier to the intelligibility of a distinction, we see that
a major task in the legal system is to manage the effects of fuzzy lines, rather
than to take the existence of a fuzzy line as a sign that something is founda-
tionally amiss.”81
While Schauer argued for maintaining a distinction that may not
always “be sharply drawn” in order to preserve the more vital information-
al “core of the First Amendment,”82 Tushnet made the case for how failure
to do so would undermine the contractual end of the balance. She maintains
that abandoning “the difficult line-drawing problems that the commercial
speech doctrine creates” would weaken “the consumer protection objec-
tives served by modern commercial speech regulation” because other caus-
es of action, such as fraud, would be less effective in protecting con-
sumers.83 As Sherry’s analysis of the Rehnquist Court’s broader jurispru-
dence (which in the most essential respects relied upon the doctrine of the
Powell Era Court in its First Amendment cases on advertising) concluded:
“[R]egulation of commercial speech raises genuinely difficult questions that
cannot be answered by mechanical recourse to ideology, theory, or first prin-
ciples.”84 She found it “therefore laudable that the Court has, by and large,
not attempted such a synthesis, but has rather approached each case in a
pragmatist, common-law fashion, building up a body of guiding (but not
rigidly constraining) precedent.”85
Still further support for this monograph’s assessment of the Hudson-
centric commercial speech doctrine and its maintenance of the intermedi-
ate-level status of commercial speech as philosophically consistent with
historically grounded principles of sound business law, experience, and
practice can be drawn from the business-oriented dispositions of many of
the justices who established the fundamental contours of that doctrine. The
Supreme Court had been dramatically reconfigured at the beginning of the
seventies, after President Nixon appointed four new justices between 1969
and 1972, including Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist. “[O]n the crucial issues, the Nixon Justices could be
expected, more often than not, to end up on the same side,” Justice Powell’s
biographer wrote. “Each of them was more conservative than any of the
holdovers from the Warren Court. Together they formed a block of four,
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loosely united by outlook and sympathy, and — apparently — poised under
the leadership of Chief Justice Burger to remake American constitutional
law.”86 Indeed, with regard to “economic freedom under the antitrust laws,
... the work of the Burger Court” would prove “little less than revolutionary
... and the result almost always was to increase business freedom and reduce
antitrust liability.”87
Not all the justices on the Court during that period had business con-
nections in their background, but several did. Even Justice William O.
Douglas, more often identified with his long career on the Warren Court,
“did not enter into his Court duties as a civil libertarian or environmental-
ist but as a corporate financial expert” from the faculty of Yale Law School
and the Securities and Exchange Commission.88 As the chairman of the
SEC, he “succeeded in establishing cooperative relationships with the
financial community and persuaded it to undertake most of the work of
reforming itself, with minimal government involvement.”89 Justice William
J. Brennan had a degree from the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce
at the University of Pennsylvania.90 Justice Potter Stewart had a successful
career in corporate law in Cincinnati before joining the Court.91 Justice
Blackmun had specialized in tax and estates work as senior partner at a
Minneapolis law firm.92
Justice Powell’s Deep Grounding in American
Business Practice
Beyond any doubt though, it was Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. who
arrived at the Court most deeply grounded in the practices of American
business — indeed, arguably more so than any justice since. “Powell’s near-
ly forty years of experience in corporate boardrooms led him to trust the
character of the average American businessman,” Pritchard wrote of the
long, successful career in corporate law that continued until his Supreme
Court appointment. “In Powell’s world, free enterprise and the businessmen
who made it work were the foundation of strong communities.”93 So exten-
sive were his business connections that before his confirmation to the Court,
he had worried that his deep and extensive associations in corporate circles
would generate the sort of controversy that contributed to the rejection of
Nixon nominee Clement Haynsworth two years before. He feared that “the
nomination of another southern lawyer with a business-oriented back-
ground would invite — if not assure — organized and perhaps prolonged
opposition.”94
The confirmation hearings went relatively smoothly, however, and
once on the Court, Justice Powell’s business orientation was unmistakable.
In regard to disclosures imposed upon publicly owned companies by gov-
ernment, for example, Pritchard found that “it would be difficult to identi-
fy anyone who did more to limit the reach of the federal securities law than
Powell.”95 Pritchard found that, while acting “in all good faith,” Justice
Powell assessed such requirements in a manner “colored by his experience
in corporate boardrooms, consistently leading him to favor narrower read-
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ings.”96 In other research, Pritchard concluded that during his years at the
Supreme Court, Justice Powell successfully worked to restrain prosecutions
for insider trading.97 More importantly, research documented the ways in
which corporate interests have won ever-greater Bill of Rights guarantees,
particularly since the early seventies.98 A number of cases in which Justice
Powell participated can be seen as part of that process, particularly his
efforts advancing First Amendment protection for commercial speech.99
Shortly after Justice Powell joined the Supreme Court, a document
became public that detailed just how extraordinary was the extent of his
concerns with advancing interests of the business community. As The New
York Times reported it in September of 1972, “Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in a con-
fidential memorandum written two months before his nomination to the
Supreme Court, urged the United States Chamber of Commerce to mount a
campaign to counter criticism of the free enterprise system in the schools
and the news media.”100 The Chamber later distributed the memorandum to
its national membership in a 1971 newsletter under the headline “Attack on
American Free Enterprise System.” Its recommendations included the
mounting of aggressive efforts in schools, media and the courts — particu-
larly the Supreme Court — to advance business interests through the initia-
tion of litigation and the filing of amici briefs. “[E]specially with an activist-
minded Supreme Court,” it declared, “the judiciary may be the most impor-
tant instrument for social, economic and political change.101
The memorandum maintained “[f]ew elements of American society
today have as little influence in government as the American businessman,
the corporation, or even the millions of corporate stockholders.”102 It called
for corporations to counter the “disquieting voices ... of criticism” by wag-
ing through advertising and other public discourse “a sustained, major
effort to inform and enlighten the American people,” not only separately but
also with a level of coordination beyond any ever mounted at that
time.103“Strength lies in organization, in careful long-range planning and
implementation, in consistency of action over an indefinite period of years,
in the scale of financing available only through joint effort, and in the polit-
ical power available only through united action and national organiza-
tions,” the memorandum declared.104 At the same time it urged the business
community to speak out more freely, it also called for maintaining an
emphasis on truth and broader societal concern in the informational efforts:
“Essential ingredients of the entire program must be responsibility.... The
publications, the articles, the speeches, the media programs, the advertising
... must meet the most exacting standards of accuracy and professional
excellence. They must merit respect for their level of public responsibili-
ty.”105 While “[n]ot all businessmen shared Powell’s passions,” historian
Kim Phillips-Fein has concluded, “those who did began to act as a vanguard
organizing the giants of American industry.”106
Justice Powell would go on — particularly in the commercial speech
cases — to demonstrate a greater priority on balancing among societal inter-
ests than on ideologically advantaging business interests over all others.
However, his appointment to the Supreme Court — as the “author of a sem-
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inal report to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce calling for counter-mobiliza-
tion against public interest lawyers” — has been described by Steven Teles
as a telling example of a reaction by many conservative lawyers and busi-
ness leaders against earlier successes of public interest law or “legal liberal-
ism.”107 Teles characterizes the memorandum as “the most notorious indi-
cation of business’s early strategic response to legal liberalism.”108 Ann
Southworth also detailed how the “counterattack” began “soon after the
release of the Powell memorandum,” quickly fulfilling not only his contem-
plation that “the U.S. Chamber of Commerce would become the primary
representative of American business in the courts and agencies” but also the
even more rapid creation of a number of “conservative public interest law
organizations” supported by foundations and business.109
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on more than one occasion has comment-
ed publicly on the striking influence of the memorandum on legal activism
by business interests, declaring, for example that it “advised the business
community to adopt the ‘astute’ ways of activist liberals ‘in exploiting judi-
cial action.’ The briefs that currently troop before the Supreme Court, from
all manner of organizations, suggest that Powell’s message has been
heard.”110 Recent analysis by legal scholar Jeffrey Rosen has linked the suc-
cess of the memorandum’s call for “creating a network of activist conserva-
tive litigation groups” with the growing strength of the “Constitution in
Exile” movement. Such efforts actively promote litigation aimed at advanc-
ing a doctrine of “economic rights” that would roll back government regu-
lation to early twentieth-century standards.111 That period is often called
the “Lochner Era” in reference to the New York v. Lochner112 ruling that
struck down a New York regulation limiting to sixty the number of hours
that bakery employees could be required to work in a week and for more
than three decades provided broad precedent for invalidating other regula-
tion of business, until its holding was rejected by the Court in West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish.113
The era in which the “Attack on American Free Enterprise System”
memorandum was first circulated has been documented as one shaped by
the historical dynamics of a backlash from big business in response to a
wave of successes by consumer and environmental movements in the late
1969s and early 1970s.114 According to Lee Edwards, official historian of the
Heritage Foundation, beer magnate Joseph Coors, Sr. said the “Attack on
American Free Enterprise System” memorandum convinced him that
American business was “ignoring a crisis,” which led him in 1971 to invest
the first $250,000 to fund what later became the Heritage Foundation.115
Such synergy between business interests and the political movement that
has come to be known as modern conservatism began to reach critical mass
in the 1970s.116 Many of the nation’s wealthiest business executives began
to generously subsidize think tanks, journals, and other media activities that
served to more widely promote the work of economists who favored a
diminished role for government regulation.117 Phillips-Fein traced how
decades of work by determined business leaders “supported and helped to
formulate the economic agenda of the conservative movement” that grew
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most publicly manifest with the rise of Ronald Reagan to national political
prominence over the course of that decade.118 The process through which
Reagan’s core themes and rhetoric were significantly shaped by his years as
a popular corporate spokesperson for General Electric after his career in the
movies ended has been detailed by Thomas Evans:119 “Much of this came
from the policies of the company he worked for and the role that company
chose to play in the politics of the nation,” he wrote.120 Phillips-Fein
devotes a chapter to the way the “Attack” memorandum “crystallized a set
of concerns shared by business conservatives in the early 1970s.”121 Other
recent works on political developments of the period have credited the
memorandum with motivating greater levels of political activity on behalf
of the modern conservative movement by the business community in the
era, both through financial support and media efforts.122
Phillips-Fein notes that Justice Powell ceased his work with the
Chamber of Commerce after joining the Court, but before then he provided
copies of his memorandum to friends in the business community and urged
greater activism of the sort the memorandum advocated.123 Those contacts
included general counsel at General Motors, and a few months later, in a
New York Times op-ed column, General Motors Chief Executive Officer R.C.
Gerstenberg called for greater influence by business interests in the market-
place of ideas. “Recent experience teaches us that the importance of public
opinion should never be underestimated, that legislation follows opinion,
and uninformed opinion can lead to bad legislation and to unreasonable
controls and restraints by government,” he wrote. “The business communi-
ty has a job to do.... Individually and collectively, we must speak out more
than we have.”124
In scholarly literature, the “Attack on American Free Enterprise
System” memorandum has been characterized as highly influential in a
number of contexts, but most broadly as the inspiration for a broad, pro-
business political movement. Houck declared that in the Powell memoran-
dum, “the concept for a business-interest litigation center was born,” begin-
ning with a study based on the memorandum by the California Chamber of
Commerce, which resulted in creation of the Pacific Legal Foundation in
1973.125 Foden labeled the wave of similar organizations that soon followed
“the Freedom Based Public Interest Movement” and also traced their inspi-
ration to the Powell memorandum’s call for “the creation of conservative
public interest groups to defend the business community in the courts.”126
Bogus characterized the Powell memorandum’s vision as “realized more
quickly and effectively than he could have imagined,” including the begin-
ning of successful “tort reform” campaigns “designed to shield big business
and medicine from citizen lawsuits.”127 Plater has discussed the role that
the memorandum’s call “for business to begin funding academic and repre-
sentational programs and foundations to counteract the 1960s ideologies in
American society” played in successful efforts to block environmental reg-
ulation.128 Franklin has linked the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s highly suc-
cessful efforts at the Supreme Court in recent years — winning almost sev-
enty percent of cases in which it filed a brief either as a party in litigation
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or as an amicus the first three terms of the Roberts Court and sixty-two per-
cent during the previous eleven terms of the Rehnquist Court — to the liti-
gation practices launched in response to Powell’s memorandum.129
Many historical assessments of the period have credited the memoran-
dum with motivating greater levels of political activity by the business com-
munity.130 Certainly, the 1970s were characterized by such efforts. The year
after the “Attack on American Free Enterprise System” memorandum was
distributed to Chamber members, some 200 chief executive officers from the
nation’s largest corporations formed the Business Roundtable in order to
establish a unified political voice representing their diverse business inter-
ests. By the middle of the decade it was being characterized in the business
press as “the most powerful voice of business in Washington.”131 The peri-
od also saw the introduction of the groundbreaking advocacy strategy that
would make Mobil Oil the most prominent corporate voice of the time by
purchasing space on The New York Times op-ed page far more regularly
than any other company had at that time.132 It proved so successful that
political scientist Walter Berns titled an essay he published at the end of the
decade “The Corporation’s Song: Book and Lyrics by Hobbes, Locke, and
Madison. Music by Mobil Oil?”133 Research has documented a process
through which the business community dramatically overhauled its manner
of engaging the legislative process over the course of the seventies.134
Edsall’s history of the era found that “the political stature of business rose
steadily from the early 1970s, one of its lowest points in the nation’s histo-
ry, until, by the end of the decade, the business community had achieved
virtual dominance of the legislative process in Congress.”135
Given the influence of Justice Powell’s “Attack on American Free
Enterprise System” memorandum in such significant historical develop-
ments and his similarly considerable influence in a series of First
Amendment cases involving business interests at the Supreme Court over
the same period, this study finds it useful to focus upon his private papers
for insight into related jurisprudence. Indeed, in the context of this study’s
analysis, it is historically justifiable and more precise to discuss the work at
the Court during those years that produced the formative body of modern
First Amendment commercial speech jurisprudence under the rubric of the
“Powell Era Court.” Eras at the High Court are more commonly bracketed in
terms of the Chief Justice in office at the time, and by that measure it is the
Burger Court that spans the years from 1969 to 1986, when Chief Justice
Burger was presiding. This monograph’s focus is more specifically on the
subset of cases falling within that period at the Court through which its doc-
trine on commercial speech was dramatically transformed. Certainly other
justices played important roles in that process, including of course Chief
Justice Burger. Yet in the context of those formative commercial speech
cases as a whole and the doctrinally defining impact of Central Hudson Gas
and Electric. v. Public Service Commission,136 it is Justice Powell whose
influence endured most substantially. The next section considers his efforts
in shaping those cases and in particular his work in successfully authoring
an opinion in Central Hudson that would be carefully balanced enough to
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meet the manifold concerns of a majority of the justices.
Commercial Speech and the Powell Era Court
Close examination of Justice Powell’s work in the Supreme Court’s
formative commercial speech cases reveals a high degree of consistency.
Cases presenting First Amendment questions involving advertising began to
arrive at the Court at the beginning of his time there, and continued to do so
almost every year he remained on the bench. Justice Powell’s private papers
indicate that from the start he favored a shift away from the earlier doctrine
in which commercial speech received no First Amendment protection.
However, at the same time — in contrast to the tone of much of the ideolog-
ically imbalanced discourse and political activity that his “Attack” memo-
randum seems to have helped foster — Justice Powell consistently empha-
sized significant concerns over the potential for totally unregulated adver-
tising to undermine the fair-bargaining process. He would maintain those
concerns in his jurisprudence consistently over the years and would suc-
cessfully institutionalize a structural balancing of them in his Central
Hudson opinion.137
For most of Justice Powell’s career in law, advertising had been deemed
a form of expression outside the parameters of First Amendment protection.
In 1942, the Supreme Court had responded almost dismissively when it
addressed the matter in Valentine v. Chrestensen, declaring in a unanimous-
ly four-page opinion that a “purely commercial advertisement” merited no
such protection from government regulation.138 The potential for a shift
away from that position, however, had been signaled in 1964 when the
Court qualified its sweeping Chrestensen pronouncement in the course of
reaching the landmark ruling that constitutionalized libel law in New York
Times v. Sullivan.139 The ruling acknowledged that the facts of that case
demonstrated advertising format alone could not bar the speech involved
from First Amendment protection.140 The Court held firm on its commercial
speech doctrine more broadly though by sharply distinguishing the Sullivan
context from that of Chrestensen. It emphasized that the latter amounted to
an effort “to evade” an ordinance regulating handbills in order to promote a
commercial venture, while Sullivan’s purpose was advancing the cause of
“a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest pub-
lic interest and concern.”141 Nevertheless, Sullivan offered an opening for
cases that worked their way toward the Court and would determine how far
First Amendment protection for advertising might be extended.
Justice Powell authored his first opinion on the subject shortly after
joining the Court in 1973’s Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations, which he declared early in the proceedings to be “very
close.”142 The newspaper that brought the case challenged a city regulation
barring help-wanted advertisements segregated according to male or female
interest. It asked the Court to “abrogate the distinction between commercial
and other speech.”143 At conference, the justices were, as Powell predicted,
closely divided, according to Justice his notes.144 He wrote that three of his
brethren (Justices Douglas, Blackmun, and Stewart) were essentially ready
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to rule as the appellants had urged — although their concern at that time
seemed to be more with freedom of the press than with protecting commer-
cial speech per se.145 Justice Douglas, for example, according to Powell,
declared that the “press is free to do what it wants regardless of any distinc-
tion between commercial and editorial matter.”146
A majority of the justices, however, were opposed to going that direc-
tion. Justice Marshall asserted that the “distinction between commercial
and editorial matter” made the decision “very simple, clear cut.” Justice
Brennan argued that the regulation did not actually restrict content and thus
was justified by the government’s interest in preventing sex discrimina-
tion.147 Justice Powell wrote that although he leaned toward upholding the
regulation, he did not find the matter as easily resolved as Justices Marshall
and Brennan and expressed concern over the Court reaching what he
viewed the correct result via an incorrect analysis.148 In his own notes
where he sought to work through the competing interests, Justice Powell
stressed that he hoped for a rationale that would avoid an imbalance in the
ruling’s precedent value by favoring “‘press’ rights over ‘free speech’” or by
punishing the press for publishing such advertisements.149
Ultimately the Court would split five-to-four and reject the newspaper’s
argument. Justice Powell’s majority opinion concluded that “[i]n the crucial
respects, the advertisements in the present record resemble the Chrestensen
rather than the Sullivan advertisement.” According to his analysis, the help-
wanted ads did not express a position on “whether, as a matter of social pol-
icy, certain positions ought to be filled by members of one or the other sex,
nor does any of them criticize the Ordinance or the Commission’s enforce-
ment practices. Each is no more than a proposal of possible employment.
The advertisements are thus classic examples of commercial speech.”
Justice Powell’s opinion indicated how unwilling he was to consider com-
mercial speech in need of First Amendment protection. He declared, for
example, that the profit motive of advertising could not by itself justify such
subordination: “If a newspaper’s profit motive were determinative, all
aspects of its operations — from the selection of news stories to the choice
of editorial position — would be subject to regulation if it could be estab-
lished that they were conducted with a view toward increased sales. Such
a basis for regulation clearly would be incompatible with the First
Amendment.”150
Nevertheless, the facts of Pittsburgh Press were insufficient to persuade
the Court “that either the decision to accept a commercial advertisement
which the advertiser directs to be placed in a sex-designated column or the
actual placement there lifts the newspaper’s actions from the category of
commercial speech.”151 Neither did those facts justify affording commercial
speech “a higher level of protection than Chrestensen and its progeny
would suggest” or — as the newspaper had argued for — abrogating “the
distinction between commercial and other speech.”152 Essentially, Justice
Powell and the Pittsburgh Press Court chose to focus the ruling more on the
specific nature of the contractual elements of commercial expression
involved, rather than on the element of informational freedom.
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“Discrimination in employment is not only commercial activity, it is illegal
commercial activity under the Ordinance,” he wrote in the majority opin-
ion.153 Thus, speech that involved illegal activity could not be justified as
preserving elements of the fair-bargaining process within the scope of trans-
actional promises between seller and buyer: “Any First Amendment inter-
est which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal
and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting
the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is
illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation
on economic activity.”154
The next year offered further evidence of how closely the Court was
divided in its efforts to arrive at the appropriate balance on First
Amendment protection for commercial speech when the Court considered
the constitutionality of a ban on political advertising on city buses in
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights.155 Five justices supported the judgment
upholding the ban, but they could not agree on a majority opinion. The plu-
rality opinion by Justice Blackmun and the dissent by Justice Brennan each
were joined by four justices.156 The plurality opinion focused on its asser-
tion that since buses did not constitute a public forum for First Amendment
purposes, the city was free to allow commercial advertising on cards post-
ed inside the buses while not accepting political advertising. Justice
Blackmun wrote, “Here, we have no open spaces, no meeting hall, park,
street corner, or other public thoroughfare. Instead, the city is engaged in
commerce” in providing bus service.157
“In much the same way that a newspaper or periodical, or even a radio
or television station, need not accept every proffer of advertising from the
general public,” his opinion declared, “a city transit system has discretion
to develop and make reasonable choices concerning the type of advertising
that may be displayed in its vehicles.”158 Although the First Amendment
bars government from making choices on an “arbitrary, capricious, or invid-
ious” basis, in the assessment of the Court, the city in Lehman had not done
so. Here, the city had chosen to avoid “sticky administrative problems [that]
might arise in parceling out limited space to eager politicians.”159 Thus, the
decision to limit advertising within city buses to “innocuous and less con-
troversial commercial and service oriented advertising” did not violate the
First Amendment, Justice Blackmun wrote. “Were we to hold to the con-
trary, display cases in public hospitals, libraries, office buildings, military
compounds, and other public facilities immediately would become Hyde
Parks open to every would-be pamphleteer and politician. This the
Constitution does not require.”160
The dissent by Justice Brennan argued that by “accepting commercial
and public service advertising [inside its buses], the city effectively waived
any argument” that advertising was “incompatible with the rapid transit
system’s primary function of providing transportation. A forum for commu-
nication was voluntarily established when the city installed the physical
facilities for the advertisements.”161 Conceding that it was “possible that
commercial advertising may be accorded less First Amendment protection
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than speech concerning political and social issues of public importance,”
Justice Brennan maintained nevertheless that to “sanction the city’s prefer-
ence for bland commercialism and noncontroversial public service mes-
sages” over political expression serves to “reverse the traditional priorities
of the First Amendment.”162 Justice Powell joined that dissent. He
expressed willingness at conference to accept regulation of excessively
intrusive advertising, but argued that print messages on city buses could not
be so classified.163 In a blunt passage in his own notes that vividly conveyed
his own position on the matter, he asked rhetorically what justified classi-
fying political advertisements as more intrusive than commercial messages:
“Is this worse than Kotex or ads for hemorrhoid relief?”164
Despite the Court’s differences in that case, the justices would reach
much greater consensus a year later and offer the clearest signal to date of
their willingness to extend First Amendment protections for commercial
speech considerably farther than ever before. At conference in Bigelow v.
Commonwealth of Virginia,165 seven justices were already in agreement
with a lower court ruling that denied a challenge to a ban on advertising
even legal abortion services that was then in place in Virginia.166 Despite the
general agreement among the justices for the essential judgment that should
be reached, Justice Powell noted early on, “I doubt this is a good vehicle to
consider the First Amendment issue.” Since the lower-court ruling, the ban
had been amended to apply only to advertising that promoted abortions —
a violation of Virginia law.167
In a subsequent ruling that reversed the conviction of a newspaper pub-
lisher for advertising the legal availability of abortion services in New
York,168 the seven-to-two majority, as in Bigelow argued that the case had
limited First Amendment application. Justice Blackmun’s opinion ostensi-
bly left Chrestensen’s essential holding intact but declared it “distinctly a
limited one” and did not provide “authority for the proposition that all
statutes regulating commercial advertising are immune from constitutional
challenge.”169 The Court found that the advertisement in Bigelow “conveyed
information of potential interest and value” that was protected, but
refrained from actually going further at that point: “We need not decide in
this case the precise extent to which the First Amendment permits regula-
tion of advertising that is related to activities the State may legitimately reg-
ulate or even prohibit.”170
By the next year, the Court was ready to take that step with a case in
which the commercial messages at issue involved none of the political or
social implications that had complicated the recent advertising cases. In
1976’s Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council,171 the Court took the opportunity to hand down the landmark rul-
ing that established First Amendment protection for speech “which does
‘no more than propose a commercial transaction.’” In that case the issue was
the advertising of prescription drug prices.172 In striking down a state
statute banning such advertising by pharmacists,173 a seven-justice majority
emphasized the restraint that the First Amendment places on government
against denying truthful information to citizens: “Virginia is free to require
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whatever professional standards it wishes of its pharmacists.... But it may
not do so by keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms
that competing pharmacists are offering.”174
Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion upheld the notion that the public
good is served when consumers receive accurate commercial information:
“So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allo-
cation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous
private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those deci-
sions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free
flow of commercial information is indispensable.”175 Yet even in making
that statement of broad support for the freedom of the informational compo-
nent of advertising, the Court made note of maintaining a doctrinal balance
through preservation of the fair-bargaining process implicated in the con-
tractual component of such speech. “The First Amendment ... does not pro-
hibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow
cleanly as well as freely,” Justice Blackmun wrote.176 He added that in “con-
cluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we
have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms…. Even if
the differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is val-
ueless, and thus subject to complete suppression by the State, they nonethe-
less suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that
the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unim-
paired.”177
To bolster that assertion, Justice Stewart authored a concurring opinion
that detailed how established principles from First Amendment law “sug-
gest that government may take broader action to protect the public from
injury produced by false or deceptive price or product advertising.”178
Justice Stewart emphasized that the Court had “on several occasions,” made
clear that “the Constitution does not provide absolute protection for false
factual statements that cause private injury.”179 In analysis that focused on
the reality of how the contractual component of commercial speech created
for it a stark contrast from press expression, Justice Stewart pointed out that
while the press “must often attempt to assemble the true facts from sketchy
and sometimes conflicting sources under the pressure of publication dead-
lines, the commercial advertiser generally knows the product or service he
seeks to sell and is in a position to verify the accuracy of his factual repre-
sentations before he disseminates them.”180 Because the “advertiser’s access
to the truth about his product and its price substantially eliminates any dan-
ger that governmental regulation of false or misleading price or product
advertising will chill accurate and nondeceptive commercial expression,”
he declared, there is less justification for sanctioning falsehood in commer-
cial speech.181
Indeed, Justice Stewart elaborated at some length on the inherent dual-
istic informational/contractual nature of commercial speech and how those
components must be balanced in First Amendment doctrine: “Commercial
price and product advertising differs markedly from ideological expression
because it is confined to the promotion of specific goods or services.”182 The
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First Amendment protects advertising “because of the ‘information of
potential interest and value’ conveyed,” not “because of any direct contri-
bution to the interchange of ideas,” he stressed.183 The “factual claims con-
tained in commercial price or product advertisements relate to tangible
goods or services” and “may be tested empirically and corrected to reflect
the truth without in any manner jeopardizing the free dissemination of
thought,” he wrote, and therefore, “the elimination of false and deceptive
claims serves to promote the one facet of commercial price and product
advertising that warrants First Amendment protection — its contribution to
the flow of accurate and reliable information relevant to public and private
decisionmaking.”184
Justice Powell was also deeply involved in attempting to shape the rul-
ing along lines he felt would most effectively contribute to the balancing
effort that characterized the majority opinion. Early in his consideration of
the case, he noted that although he perceived “no legitimate state interest
that is furthered by a prohibition against advertising the prices of prescrip-
tion drugs,” he believed the question before the Court should be addressed
through an analysis “under which First Amendment interests are balanced
against the state’s interest in the regulation.”185 He noted after oral argu-
ments that the ruling should be grounded in “a derivative right to receive
communication” but “should make clear” the First Amendment “doesn’t
preclude regulation of false or misleading advertising.”186 His papers indi-
cate that he had decided early regarding the judgment but that he wrestled
longer with what he felt would be the best way to express constitutional
support for commercial speech in terms that did not sweep aside “the state
interest in protecting professional standards” or allow unlimited “advertis-
ing by lawyers, doctors, and other professionals.”187
Upon reviewing a draft of Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion that
Justice Powell felt could “prevent a discriminating assessment — and bal-
ancing — of the public interest against the First Amendment rights when we
have the medical and legal professions before us,” he wrote to request addi-
tion of a passage that would emphasize: “Doctors and lawyers, for example,
do not dispense standardized products; they render professional services of
almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced opportu-
nity for confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of
advertising.”188
After Justice Brennan suggested avoiding use of the word “opportuni-
ty” in that manner, which he felt connoted “ambulance chasers,”189 Justice
Blackmun arrived at a more tactful phrasing that persuaded Justice Powell
to join the opinion. “We stress that we have considered in this case the reg-
ulation of commercial advertising by pharmacists. Although we express no
opinion as to other professions, the distinctions, historical and functional,
between professions, may require consideration of quite different factors,”
Blackmun wrote. “Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not dispense
standardized products; they render professional services of almost infinite
variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion
and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising.”190
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Chief Justice Burger also authored a concurring opinion that set out the
“quite different factors [that] would govern were we faced with a law regu-
lating or even prohibiting advertising by the traditional learned professions
of medicine or law.”191
Justice Powell was relatively less invested in shaping 1977’s Linmark
Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro192 in which he joined the major-
ity holding that declared unconstitutional a city ban on the posting of signs
advertising homes for sale, finding “no meaningful distinction between” it
and “the statute overturned in Virginia Pharmacy.”193 The ordinance was
intended to promote racial integration by preventing “‘panic selling’ ... by
whites who feared that the township was becoming all black, and that prop-
erty values would decline.”194 In his notes from the justices’ conference on
the case, Powell indicated that he found it an “[e]xtremely close case” to
which he “probably would not dissent — either way.” After Virginia
Pharmacy, he believed there were limits on commercial speech and that the
city’s interest justifying the regulation in Linmark Associates was “very
strong.”195
The majority opinion by Justice Marshall focused on the Court’s con-
clusion that the challenged regulation “acted to prevent its residents from
obtaining certain information,” information “of vital interest” to residents,
considering its bearing on their decisions on “where to live and raise their
families.”196 The city council had “sought to restrict the free flow of these
data” because it feared that otherwise homeowners would “make decisions
inimical to what the Council views as the homeowners,’” decisions “to
leave town,” Justice Marshall wrote.197 Thus the government’s concern was
“not with any commercial aspect of ‘For Sale’ signs … but with the sub-
stance of the information communicated to Willingboro citizens. If dissem-
ination of this information can be restricted, then every locality in the coun-
try can suppress any facts that reflect poorly on the locality.”198 Denying
government “such sweeping powers” was precisely what Virginia
Pharmacy was all about, Justice Marshall emphasized, in that it firmly
rejected any claim by government that “the only way it could enable its cit-
izens to find their self-interest was to deny them information that is neither
false nor misleading.”199
Justice Powell joined in much more vigorously the next year upon dis-
covering in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona200 that despite his earlier efforts to
wall off Virginia Pharmacy from its holding being extended to advertising
by physicians and lawyers, a majority of his brethren found insufficient
basis to justify a total ban on advertising by attorneys.201 “The choice
between the dangers of suppressing information and the dangers arising
from its free flow was seen as precisely the choice ‘that the First
Amendment makes for us,’” Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion said of
Virginia Pharmacy. “Like the Virginia statutes, the disciplinary rule serves
to inhibit the free flow of commercial information and to keep the public in
ignorance.”202 Thus, the majority concluded that what was in question in
Bates was “whether the State may prevent the publication ... [of] truthful
advertisement concerning the availability and terms of routine legal servic-
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es,” and that it must “rule simply that the flow of such information may not
be restrained.”203 Nevertheless, it also reinforced the intrinsic relationship
of the informational/contractual balance to the First Amendment protection
accorded to commercial expression. Because “the public and private bene-
fits from commercial speech derive from confidence in its accuracy and reli-
ability,” Justice Blackmun wrote, “the leeway for untruthful or misleading
expression that has been allowed in other contexts has little force in the
commercial arena.”204
Justice Powell’s papers indicate, however, that he felt the greater thrust
of the ruling potentially represented an unjustified imbalancing in commer-
cial speech jurisprudence. After oral arguments he noted that “most lawyer
ads would be inherently deceptive if price for services” were allowed to be
advertised, and even though he found “[t]his particular ad is close. On bal-
ance I think it is likely to mislead.”205 When he reviewed Justice Blackmun’s
draft opinion himself, Justice Powell politely rejected his clerk’s analysis of
it: “Good memo. I’ll not buy a good deal of it.”206 He made extensive notes
of his own on the draft opinion207 and developed a substantial dissent.208 He
concurred with the part of the majority holding that rejected an antitrust
claim by the appellants but refused to “join the Court’s holding that under
the First Amendment ‘truthful’ newspaper advertising of a lawyer’s prices
for ‘routine legal services’ may not be restrained.”209
He insisted that the holding was too “explicit and expansive with
respect to the advertising of undefined ‘routine legal services’ a result “nei-
ther required by the First Amendment, nor in the public interest.”210 Powell
contended that “there simply is no way to test ‘empirically’ the claims made
in” much advertising of legal services because of “serious difficulties in
determining whether the advertised services fall within the Court’s unde-
fined category of ‘routine services.’”211 “These are not factual questions for
which there are ‘truthful’ answers,” he maintained, because “in most
instances, the answers would turn on relatively subjective judgments as to
which there could be wide differences of opinion.”212
In 1978, Justice Powell wrote that he saw “Bates’ chickens coming
home to roost!”213 in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association.214 The case
involved a First Amendment challenge to sanctions against an attorney who
had induced two 18-year-old women, one of whom was lying in traction in
a hospital bed to hire him to recover damages after an automobile acci-
dent.215 In doing so he utilized tactics that involved undue influence, over-
reaching, and misrepresentation to a degree that Justice Marshall character-
ized them as “classic examples of ‘ambulance chasing.’”216 The Court
seemed to agree with Justice Powell that some degree of balancing was in
order from its ruling in Bates just the year before. Five other justices joined
his majority opinion and its judgment that government “constitutionally
may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary gain,
under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to pre-
vent” received unanimous backing.217 Justice Blackmun called the majority
opinion “a good middle-of-the-road opinion that resolves this case and
lends at least some guidance for the future.”218
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“The solicitation of business by a lawyer through direct, in-person com-
munication with the prospective client has long been viewed as inconsis-
tent with the profession’s ideal of the attorney-client relationship and as
posing a significant potential for harm to the prospective client,” Justice
Powell wrote. “It has been proscribed by the organized Bar for many
years…. The entitlement of in-person solicitation of clients to the protection
of the First Amendment differs from that of the kind of advertising approved
in Bates, as does the strength of the State’s countervailing interest in prohi-
bition.”219 In refusing to provide First Amendment protection to that form
of advertising, Justice Powell’s opinion clearly reasserted his belief that “[t]o
require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncom-
mercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of
the force of the Amendment’s guarantee with respect to the latter kind of
speech.”220 He declared that in-person “solicitation of professional employ-
ment by a lawyer does not stand on a par with truthful advertising about the
availability and terms of routine legal services, let alone with forms of
speech more traditionally within the concern of the First Amendment.”221
Powell continued to firmly advance that assertion in 1979’s Friedman
v. Rogers,222 indicating early in the Court’s consideration of the case that it
should not extend First Amendment protection to trade names, as the lower
court had in Friedman.223 “[A] trade name is not speech,” he insisted,
because it “is a property interest” rather than a First Amendment right and
“conveys no information intrinsically — only by association.”224 According
to Powell’s notes, there was wide agreement among the justices on that at
conference. Justice Stevens asserted, “We must contain” the commercial
speech doctrine, limiting “our cases to situations where [the] purpose is to
convey truthful information.”225 Similarly, Justice Stewart underscored at
conference: “Truth was emphasized” in the previous commercial speech
cases. “This statute is intended to promote full disclosure.”226
Ultimately, Justice Powell authored a majority opinion that sharply dis-
tinguished economic regulation of property interests such as trade names
from regulation of protected forms of expression.227 In doing so, he provid-
ed further articulation of the contrasting functions of informational and con-
tractual expression. “A trade name that has acquired such associations to
the extent of establishing a secondary meaning becomes a valuable proper-
ty of the business, protected from appropriation by others,” he wrote. “But
a property interest in a means of communication does not enlarge or dimin-
ish the First Amendment protection of that communication. Accordingly,
there is no First Amendment rule ... requiring a State to allow deceptive or
misleading commercial speech whenever the publication of additional
information can clarify or offset the effects of the spurious communication,”
Justice Powell pronounced. “There is no claim in this case that Rogers or
other optometrists practicing under trade names have been deprived of
property without due process of law, or indeed that their property has been
taken at all.”228
Thus, a series of commercial speech cases had set the stage by the end
of the decade for Central Hudson Gas and Electric v. Public Service
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Commission.229 The Powell Era Court had firmly distanced the jurispru-
dence from the earlier doctrine that left advertising beyond the scope of
First Amendment protections. Yet it had just as clearly demonstrated its
commitment to balancing the interests of sellers’ informational speech
against the interests of buyers to be protected from deceptive expression
that would undermine the fair-bargaining process.
Centering the Doctrine on Central Hudson
In Central Hudson, which involved a First Amendment challenge to a
New York ban on any advertising that promoted the use of electricity,
Justice Powell led the Court more resolutely and made his most enduring
contribution to the modern commercial speech doctrine. What would insti-
tutionalize the ruling’s importance would be the standardized, four-part
test230 that he developed for determining whether a government regulation
of advertising challenged on First Amendment grounds could withstand an
intermediate level of scrutiny.231 As Powell developed the Hudson test, the
clerk who assisted him with the case observed that the “first commercial
speech cases could not be especially rigorous in this way because they were
still breaking free of the demons of Valentine v. Chrestensen. By now, how-
ever, it seems appropriate to try to apply a disciplined approach instead of
the more ad-hoc balancing methods used in the early cases.”232
Drafting a majority opinion that would accomplish that goal and draw
majority support, however, represented a considerable challenge. At confer-
ence, seven justices had indicated they would strike down the New York
ban even though they disagreed with how to reach that conclusion.233
Ultimately, eight justices would join Justice Powell’s judgment declaring the
ban unconstitutional, but three of them authored concurring opinions to
articulate their differences in conceptualizing the basis for that judgment.234
Despite all that, Powell successfully established his Central Hudson test
through his opinion-crafting efforts detailed in this section. It remains to
this day the most pivotal of all modern commercial speech rulings. “Justice
Powell was always concerned about what judges and lawyers would do
with the opinion after the Court handed down its ruling, so he liked provid-
ing the clearest possible guidance for the future — without, of course, decid-
ing future cases,” recalled David O. Stewart, the clerk with whom he
worked closely with the Central Hudson opinion.235
As their development of the test proceeded, Powell expressed satisfac-
tion that it was not “too ‘elaborate’ or ‘academic.’” In his assessment, “[t]he
first step (whether the speech is ‘commercial’) usually will be simple. The
second step (whether the governmental interest is substantial) presents a
familiar question that usually is a judgment call.” He deemed the rest of the
test more intellectually demanding but still tenable: “The next two steps
are: whether the regulation is related directly to the state interest, and
whether it restricts expression unrelated to the state interest. These also are
‘judgment calls’, and yet they are familiar ones, and the four together do
contribute — I think — to an orderly, step-by-step analysis.”236
Justice Powell did not pretend, however, that such a complex challenge
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016jmo.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
as balancing between competing and often contradictory interests would be
neatly and patly resolved in every way. Even as he proceeded to apply his
nascent Central Hudson test to the facts at hand in that landmark case, he
acknowledged that the delicate balancing effort it set forth forced him to
devote considerable deliberation to determining how to come out “on the
right side of this issue.”237 In particular he focused on how to most practi-
cally apply the subjective question of the test’s fourth prong — whether the
regulation in question was “not more extensive than is necessary” to serve
the government’s interest justifying the regulation.238 He went so far as to
ask his clerk to formally develop alternate analyses — one coming to the
conclusion that the regulation was too extensive and another “that ends up
the other way,” so that he could most fully reason through the matter.239
Powell’s exhaustive such efforts at that stage of the deliberations clearly
document his remarkably deep commitment to finding as effective and
appropriate balance as possible. Despite his aversion to government restric-
tions on a business’ advertising, he told his clerk he also greatly feared “fur-
ther disorders and revolution among the Arab states by forces that are
encouraged by the USSR and that are bitterly hostile to our country,” that
led to another crippling disruption in the nation’s petroleum supply as with
the 1973 embargo that precipitated the same regulation challenged in
Central Hudson.240 His concern caused him to agonize over the justification
for declaring “the regulation at issue invalid merely because it reaches
beyond what appears to be the immediate problem, when it might be justi-
fied as a reasonable precautionary measure for the future.”241
The extent to which Justice Powell, with his avowed determination to
advance business interests and particularly their ability to promulgate infor-
mation and ideas, wrestled with striking the most judicious balance in
Central Hudson is revelatory. It further supports an understanding of the
formative commercial speech cases as forging a difficult but necessary com-
mitment to maintain a balance between competing interests — a balance so
fine that it successfully resists structural bias in either direction. Ultimately,
in the Central Hudson case, it would be part four of the Central Hudson test
that Powell resolved to be decisive in reaching his holding. He concluded
that the regulation survived the first three prongs of the test,242 but “reach-
es all promotional advertising, regardless of the impact ... on overall energy
use ... [and] the energy conservation rationale, as important as it is, cannot
justify suppressing information about electric devices or services” that
might be more energy efficient and thus could reduce total energy consump-
tion. Finding “no showing has been made that a more limited restriction on
the content of promotional advertising would not serve adequately the
State’s interests,” his opinion declared the ban unconstitutional because it
had failed to meet the standard required under the fourth prong of his
Central Hudson test.243 Powell proceeded, however, to suggest that the state
might “further its policy of conservation” by developing regulations that
would “restrict the format and content” of such advertising, for example so
as to “require that the advertisements include information about the relative
efficiency and expense of the offered service, both under current conditions
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and for the foreseeable future.”244 Thus, even in striking down a regulation
on commercial speech, he seemed to strive toward sustaining the truest bal-
ance possible by recommending new regulation more likely to be upheld
under his four-part test.
Central Hudson represented the watershed moment for the Powell Era
Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence. It did not resolve all debate at the
Court, but it firmly fixed the cornerstone for the remaining cases during
Justice Powell’s tenure. In 1981, a six-vote majority for the judgment struck
down a city ban on most outdoor signs in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, though only a plurality joined Justice White’s opinion announcing
that judgment.245 Powell would join the plurality opinion which found that
the regulation survived the Central Hudson test but still was unconstitution-
al because it permitted signs advertising goods or services available on sites
where signs were located but did not permit noncommercial messages on
those signs.246 The failure to include an exception for noncommercial
speech on such onsite signs meant the regulation was unconstitutional on
its face, the Court said, because “[i]nsofar as the city tolerates billboards at
all, it cannot choose to limit their content to commercial messages; the city
may not conclude that the communication of commercial information con-
cerning goods and services connected with a particular site is of greater
value than the communication of noncommercial messages.”247 Justice
White’s opinion concluded that the Court was forced to apply Central
Hudson in that manner because the San Diego regulation, by “affording a
greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial speech,”
had “invert[ed]” the doctrine of “recent commercial speech cases [that] have
consistently accorded noncommercial speech a greater degree of protection
than commercial speech.”248
Justice Powell joined an even stronger affirmation of that distinction in
1983’s Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products that supplemented the first step
(whether the speech is commercial) of the Central Hudson test with a three-
part test for distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial speech
when both elements might be present. In order to determine whether the fly-
ers and pamphlets promoting a condom manufacturer’s products — but also
discussing venereal disease and family planning — could be considered
commercial messages subject to federal regulation, the Court developed the
three-part Bolger test to consider a combination of the advertising format of
the messages, reference to a specific product, and the economic motivation
for disseminating the messages.249 It stressed that no one of those three fac-
tors alone would necessarily prove dispositive, when considered together in
the case at hand, “the informational pamphlets are properly characterized
as commercial speech ... notwithstanding the fact that they contain discus-
sions of important public issues.”250 That approach represented a further
internal balancing component within the broader Hudson-centric doctrine,
particularly in relation to step one of the four-part Hudson test. It also fur-
ther distinguished commercial speech, with its dual informational and con-
tractual components, from political speech — which does not include the
latter. Justice White’s majority opinion invoked Central Hudson in its asser-
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tion that “[w]e have made clear that advertising which ‘links a product to a
current public debate’ is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection
afforded noncommercial speech.”251 With that element of the Central
Hudson test resolved, the Court then proceeded to apply the rest of it to the
facts at hand. In doing so, it concluded that a federal ban on the unsolicited
mailing of contraceptive advertisements was unconstitutional because it
was more extensive than necessary to advance the government’s asserted
interests in protecting from such mailings those adults who might be offend-
ed and children.252
Justice Powell also joined the majority opinion in Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico253 that upheld a ban on adver-
tising in Puerto Rico that promoted that country’s casinos. The majority
applied the Central Hudson test and found the ban to be constitutional in
that its restriction on a form of commercial speech advanced a substantial
government interest (promoting the public welfare by reducing demand for
gambling) in a manner that was no more extensive than necessary.254
Writing in dissent, however, Justice Brennan argued that Posadas had gone
too far beyond the Court’s prior commercial speech cases that had accepted
regulation of “dissemination of information that is false, deceptive, or mis-
leading ... or that proposes an illegal transaction,” but not restrictions
“designed to deprive consumers of accurate information about products and
services legally offered for sale.”255
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion asserted that even though casino
gambling was legal in Puerto Rico, “the Puerto Rico Legislature surely could
have prohibited casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico altogether.
In our view, the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessar-
ily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling.”256
Justice Powell’s notes indicate that he believed the Court reached the cor-
rect decision in applying the Central Hudson test.257 If that interpretation
had gone on to be maintained as dominant with the Court in cases handed
down since then, it quite arguably could have represented a potential imbal-
ancing tilt away from substantial protection of the informational component
of commercial expression. However, the fact that the Court has moved away
from that interpretation — while still maintaining its doctrinal focus within
the centricity of Hudson — demonstrates the strength of Hudson’s structur-
al balancing mechanism.
In cases since the Powell Era, however, the Court’s commercial speech
doctrine has focused most sharply on preventing government from denying
citizens truthful information in advertising, particularly with regulation
that seeks to discourage activities that are otherwise legal.258 In the Court’s
splintered 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island259 decision seven years after
Posadas, Justice Stevens — who had joined Justice Brennan’s dissent in that
case — returned to similar arguments in a part of his 44 Liquormart opinion
that was joined by three other justices. “Posadas erroneously performed the
First Amendment analysis,” he wrote, contending that the regulation in
question was actually more extensive than necessary.260 “The casino adver-
tising ban was designed to keep truthful, nonmisleading speech from mem-
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bers of the public for fear that they would be more likely to gamble if they
received it. As a result, the advertising ban served to shield the State’s
antigambling policy from the public scrutiny that more direct, nonspeech
regulation would draw,” he declared.261
Justice Stevens also rejected arguments for a “vice” exception that pro-
vided greater deference to legislative efforts that targeted activities so cate-
gorized. He declared that the scope of such an exception “would be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to define. Almost any product that poses some threat
to public health or public morals might reasonably be characterized by a
state legislature as relating to ‘vice activity.’ Such characterization, howev-
er, is anomalous when applied to products such as alcoholic beverages, lot-
tery tickets, or playing cards, that may be lawfully purchased on the open
market.”262 Recognizing such an exception, he contended, “would also have
the unfortunate consequence of either allowing state legislatures to justify
censorship by the simple expedient of placing the ‘vice’ label on selected
lawful activities, or requiring the federal courts to establish a federal com-
mon law of vice.”263
Although Justice O’Connor and the three justices who joined her con-
currence in 44 Liquormart did not join that part of Justice Stevens’ princi-
pal opinion, she characterized Posadas as insufficiently faithful to Central
Hudson. “Since Posadas, however, this Court has examined more search-
ingly the State’s professed goal, and the speech restriction put into place to
further it, before accepting a State’s claim that the speech restriction satis-
fies First Amendment scrutiny,” she wrote.264 “The closer look that we have
required since Posadas comports better with the purpose of the analysis set
out in Central Hudson, by requiring the State to show that the speech
restriction directly advances its interest and is narrowly tailored.”265
Though that has represented a departure from the Posadas rationale that
advertising could be regulated concerning activities that government could
ban (whether it actually had or not), it remained consistent with the broad-
er Powell Era emphasis on protecting the dissemination of truthful informa-
tion in advertising. That emphasis was reiterated time and again in the cases
of that defining period, particularly Virginia Pharmacy,266 Linmark
Associates,267 Bates,268 Ohralik,269 and Central Hudson.270
In the end, the successful influence of the most experientally business-
oriented justice to serve on the Court in recent decades can be seen to
endure in rulings that without close consideration may seem contradictory.
But in light of the historical record examined here, we can see that the cor-
porate attorney who called for greater business influence in his 1971
“Attack” memorandum did so to address what he saw then as a state of
imbalance in American society. It would become clear over the course of
Justice Powell’s work on the commercial speech doctrine that it was indeed
balance that he was seeking, rather than giving excessive advantage to busi-
ness interests over all other societal concerns. That successful institutional-
ization of Powellian balance is reflected in the doctrine’s ongoing commit-
ment to fairly considering competing interests that resist the tilt in either
direction. It provides a structural mechanism that serves to preserve an
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adjudicational focal point that has been maintained, over time, always
somewhere between unchecked freedom of the informational component of
advertising and suppressive enforcement of the fair-bargaining process that
is implicated in the contractual component of such speech. Justice Powell’s
determined assertion of his own unwavering commitment toward maintain-
ing that fundamental balance was driven by his own deep background in
historically grounded principles of sound business law, experience, and
practice that shaped his constitutional considerations of First Amendment
questions concerning commercial speech.
Philosophical and Experiental Cornerstones
Insight into the intellectual pillars guiding Justice Powell’s understand-
ing of those historically grounded principles can be found in his active and
ongoing efforts over many years to maintain balance in informational and
contractual elements involved in attorney advertising. As discussed above,
his efforts were considerable, beginning in Virginia Pharmacy and continu-
ing in later cases to focus on the concerns reflected in regulation of such
advertising so as to shape the ruling along lines he felt most appropriate for
the form of expression involved. His papers indicate he wrestled longest
with that element of Virginia Pharmacy, pressing his fellow justices insis-
tently to articulate the Court’s greater constitutional protection for commer-
cial speech in terms that would not undermine “the state interest in protect-
ing professional standards” by allowing unlimited “advertising by lawyers,
doctors, and other professionals.”271
Such concerns reflect consistency with his efforts at “weeding out
unethical lawyers” as president of the American Bar Association in 1964
and 1965.272 The first initiative he launched was comprehensive reform of
legal ethics, with a focus on canons capable of effective enforcement and
disciplinary action. The project he began in 1964 was completed with the
adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969,273 replacing the
ABA’s 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics and maintaining its ban on adver-
tising by lawyers.274 It provided the basis for regulations on lawyer adver-
tising that began to be challenged in a number of states in the 1970s.275 That
project and the Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence toward greater pro-
tection of truthful commercial speech would lead the ABA to work toward
a less restrictive code during the same period.276 As the only member of the
Court during that period who had been appointed directly from private
practice, Justice Powell seemed determined to maintain the vigilance
against unethical lawyers that had been a major tenet of his ABA presiden-
cy.
Further insight into such an understanding of historically grounded
principles of sound business law, experience, and practice is reflected in
Justice Powell’s concerns with maintaining balance in business law more
broadly. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,277 for example, a case that involved
the extent of due-process protections related to property sequestered in a
business transaction, he wrote that the “determination of what due process
requires in a given context depends on a consideration of both the nature of
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the governmental function involved and the private interests affected.”278
He characterized the governmental function involved as providing “a rea-
sonable and fair framework of rules which facilitate commercial transac-
tions on a credit basis, which “protect the legitimate interests of both cred-
itor and debtor.”279 Justice Powell declared that in upholding the Louisiana
statute in question that the Court had wisely embraced “a fairer balancing
of the interests of the respective parties” than it had in an earlier related rul-
ing.280
That effort to maintain equilibrium among competing interests was
deeply fundamental to his jurisprudence and can be seen as a consistent
quality in the guiding philosophy that shaped his work at the Court. “In
most cases, Justice Powell wanted to balance. That’s who he was,” says
Stewart, the former clerk who worked closely with Justice Powell on
Central Hudson. “He also wanted to give guidance to lower courts going for-
ward, which is why he fostered so many two-part, three-prong, and four-
step tests. We, his clerks, figured this all out within a few months.”281
In the commercial speech cases and others, Justice Powell’s determined
striving for balance between the competing interests of buyer and seller in
a fair-bargaining process can be seen as more broadly consistent with a sim-
ilar emphasis on balancing core elements in the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), the most widely embraced set of guidelines for harmonizing the law
governing commercial transactions. It has been adopted by all fifty states
and has served as the model for other nations and for international codes,
and its principles reflect an unwavering emphasis on maintaining funda-
mental balance between freedom of contract and the fair-bargaining process.
In considering the core principles of sound business law, experience, and
practice, the UCC evinces the clear institutionalization of such principles in
the philosophical underpinnings for the actual body of civil law guided by
the Code. Indeed, the UCC itself actually represents guidance rather law. It
provides a uniform set of comprehensive guidelines that are adopted by leg-
islatures on a state-by-state basis, but individual states may make nonuni-
form amendments and state courts may develop nonuniform interpretations
of particular provisions.282
The resolute, overriding balance between freedom of contract and the
fair-bargaining process that is maintained in all UCC guidelines and is
intrinsic to any understanding of them provides contextual support for this
monograph’s articulation of Justice Powell’s efforts to structure core princi-
ples of sound business law, experience, and practice as centric to modern
commercial speech jurisprudence. The Code fundamentally establishes “a
broad policy favoring freedom of contract in commercial dealings and flex-
ibility through agreement.”283 And at the same time, the most significant
limitation on that broad freedom of contract is that “the parties may not dis-
claim the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care
imposed by the Code.”284 Thus, the firm maintenance of that overriding bal-
ance between dynamics-in-conflict in all considerations of the UCC is pro-
posed here as support for understanding the Supreme Court’s modern,
Hudson-centric commercial speech doctrine as philosophically consistent
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with historically grounded principles of sound business law, experience,
and practice.
While the UCC is a massive document, filled with lawyerly language
and exceptions to exceptions to exceptions, its commitment to maintaining
that often quite problematic balance is striking. Throughout all the myriad
provisions of the UCC, it is the maintenance of that balance that is the uni-
fying theme — an unwavering assertion that freedom and fair bargaining
must both be maintained in order for commercial transactions to be truly
lawful. That theme can be understood as similarly representing the “unique
aspect of commercial speech,” as Farber articulated it, as “a prelude to, and
therefore ... integrated into, a contract, the essence of which is the presence
of a promise.”285 In that sense, to consider First Amendment protection for
commercial speech only in a theoretical marketplace-of-ideas vacuum —
discrete from the realities of the commercial marketplace — perpetuates
what Dibadj called the “penultimate anomaly, ... an unwillingness to ask
why a government that can regulate an underlying commercial transaction
should not be able to regulate speech promoting the same commercial trans-
action.”286
The UCC is too practical a work to maintain such an abstract dissocia-
tion between its own fundamental dynamics, essential as they are to main-
taining a successful commercial marketplace. For it exists not as an arbitrary
imposition of government but as a comprehensive set of guidelines engen-
dered through the business community’s historical experience with the sort
of practices most conducive to development of commerce. It serves “to sim-
plify, clarify, and modernize the law of commercial transactions, and to per-
mit the continued expansion of commercial practices by custom, usage, and
agreement of the parties.”287 As discussed in the previous section, the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court justices who constructed the formative
body of rulings on First Amendment protection for commercial speech sug-
gests a similarly practical conceptualization of the critical elements
involved.
The Uniform Commercial Code’s bedrock grounding in the corollary
principles of freedom and fair bargaining is stated in terms that make quite
clear their inseverability: “The effect of the provisions of this Act may be
varied by agreement, ... except that the obligations of good faith, diligence,
reasonableness, and care prescribed by the Act may not be disclaimed by
agreement.”288 As one authoritative treatise on the UCC puts it, “[t]he gen-
eral rule is that parties are free to make their own contracts for the sale and
purchase of goods…. [F]reedom of contract is the rule rather than the excep-
tion.”289 The prominence of that rule’s bias in favor of freedom is matched
by that of the Code’s fair-bargaining rule: “Every contract or duty within [the
Uniform Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its per-
formance and enforcement.”290
It “sets forth a basic principle running throughout the Uniform
Commercial Code. The principle is that in commercial transactions good
faith is required in the performance and enforcement of all agreements or
duties,” another treatise states. Even though “this duty is explicitly stated in
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some provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the applicability of the
duty is broader than merely these situations and applies generally ... to the
performance or enforcement of every contract or duty within this Act.”291 It
calls for “first, honesty in fact and second, the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing…. This requirement is unwaivable.
Parties cannot contract away good faith.”292 Additionally, the UCC “divides
the world into two classes of people — ‘merchants’ and ‘nonmerchants,’ ...
[with] ‘merchants’ held to higher and stricter standards” than nonmerchants
— buyers who are not merchants but rather ordinary consumers.293
Indisputably, maintaining both principles of freedom and fair bargain-
ing as such constant and paramount priorities is often far from an easy mat-
ter. In “an ancient and continuing dispute,” for example, the Code has often
“steered a crooked course” back and forth between whether objective or
subjective forms of tests are most effective in determining good faith in com-
plex cases.294 Recent decades have favored objective measures focused on
the current standard of “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing.”295 But crucially, the fact that main-
taining such a balance is difficult has not led to evolving the UCC so as to
diminish the prominence of either element in its broad application. Quite
similarly, the Supreme Court’s Hudson-centric commercial speech doctrine
acknowledges the difficulty in maintaining a doctrinal balance between
protecting the freedom of the informational component of advertising while
preserving the fair-bargaining process implicated in the contractual compo-
nent of such speech.
While the Central Hudson test may not have “served that goal perfect-
ly,”296 it has performed well enough that over the more than three decades
since it was introduced, no majority of the Court has found a better way. The
UCC reflects a deep and consistent commitment to preserving the fair-bar-
gaining process, reflecting the reality that “[m]isrepresentation, duress,
overreaching, and unconscionability are well-known contract doctrines,” so
in Farber’s assessment: “When the state attacks these problems with mod-
ern regulatory tools, it can legitimately claim an interest quite distinct from
the suppression of free expression.”297 That is, since commercial transac-
tions are so justifiably subject to extensive regulation — as attested to in the
exhaustive provisions of the UCC — it is similarly justifiable to “include the
attachment of liability to the use of language in connection with” such
transactions.298
In taking further the analogical case for providing commercial speech
an intermediate level of First Amendment protection — rather than the
higher level accorded political expression — Posner has utilized economic
analysis to demonstrate the sharp distinction between the two forms of
speech. For a “scientific, ethical political, aesthetic, or religious idea,” the
“potential audience through the ages may greatly exceed the audience of the
original expositor of the idea; the difference is a measure of the idea’s exter-
nal benefits.”299 That is, “the truth of many ideas and the beauty of most art
cannot be resolved by any forensic practices, but must be left to the verdict
of time. Neither Copernicus’ theory of the solar system nor Einstein’s theo-
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ries of relativity could be verified at the time they were announced (let
alone by a court!). Nor could Shakespeare have been pronounced a great
writer at the time his plays were written.”300
In contrast, Posner proposes, “Most of the benefits of advertising a par-
ticular brand of good or service ... are captured by the producer of that
brand.”301 And whereas the “law’s evidentiary methods ... seem pretty
hopeless for resolving difficult questions of political or scientific truth and
consequence, or aesthetic value and consequence, either on the cost or ben-
efit side,”302 a “false representation regarding the price, quality, or quantity
of a good or service offered for sale can usually be unmasked in a legal pro-
ceeding without a great expenditure of time and money or a great risk of
error.”303 Therefore, since the capture of external benefits is relatively so
much more immediate with commercial speech, in that analysis “[p]olitical
speech simply is more vulnerable to suppression by government regulation”
and justifies more absolute protection.304
Indeed, the business community has readily and widely embraced the
elaborate protocol represented by the Uniform Commercial Code and its
fundamental balance between protecting both the fair-bargaining process
and freedom of contract. And yet in political discourse, a different trend
developed in the later part of the twentieth century that was broader than
the parameters of the commercial speech doctrine and would serve to tilt
societal standards in countless ways out of any such balance. Just as the
long view of human experience in this context provides considerable sup-
port for historically grounded principles of sound business law and practice
over ideology, once again this most recent chapter offers lessons in the haz-
ards of ideologically driven imbalance in economic affairs. As noted in the
introduction, the current vantage point offers opportunities to assess evi-
dence that we have lived through an end of an era of ideologically driven
imbalance of economic affairs that represents a test case that can affirm the
enduring value of the Powellian balance. The dramatic events of that
episode, in such a recent evolution in political and economic culture, pres-
ent an uncommonly instructive opportunity in this monograph to take the-
oretical analysis beyond abstract discussion and place it in historical con-
text that demonstrates support for its applicability in the course of actual
human affairs.
An Era of Ideologically Driven Imbalance
Over the decades since Central Hudson, considerable discourse has
challenged more broadly the need for the sort of balance in business law
that would justify — among many other things — a commercial speech doc-
trine that maintained justification for preserving the fair-bargaining process
implicated in the contractual component of advertising. Such discourse
quite often stands in contrast to the historically grounded principles of
sound business law, experience, and practice reflected in Justice Powell’s
Hudson-centric doctrine maintaining balance in commercial speech consti-
tutional jurisprudence. Rather than balance, that discourse has promoted an
ideological understanding that serves to promote relegating protection of
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the fair-bargaining process to a subordinate status regarding freedom of con-
tract.
The potential hazards of such imbalance in the economic marketplace
and marketplace of ideas played out quite dramatically and publicly in the
economic crisis of 2008. The greatest testament of the staggering devastation
such imbalance can wreak would come not from those who opposed what
Posner described as the dominant “doctrinaire, free-market, pro-business,
anti-regulatory ideology,”305 but from a great many of those who had up
until the brink of the economic crisis been its most avid proponents. The
role that fraudulent representations played in the global economic crash
that unfolded during the latter months of 2008 have since been reported
upon and analyzed at considerable length. The role that historical develop-
ments over the three decades preceding that crash played in unleashing
such representations has also been well documented.
Discourses that would prove dominant in political culture during that
time were signaled with some of the most prominent pronouncements by
American presidents over the course of the era. “Government is not the
solution,” Ronald Reagan told the world minutes after being sworn into
office in January of 1981. “Government is the problem.”306 His inaugural
address marked the most prominent institutionalization of rhetorical strate-
gies that had been advanced broadly and successfully during the previous
decade. They powerfully reshaped the assumptions and behavior of busi-
ness leaders, politicians, government officials, economists, and countless
other individuals. It is through “a belief system — a set of theories, beliefs
and myths with some internal coherence … [that] seeks to universalize the
interests of one social sector to the whole community,” as sociologist
Walden Bello has articulated the complex social process, that “an ideology
is internalized by large numbers of people.”307
Central to the movement was promotion of an understanding that “free-
ing market forces from state restraints ... [will] work to the good not only of
business, but also to that of the whole community.”308 It proved such an
effective organizing principle that in a relatively short time it “became
canonical, solidified into a new orthodoxy that anathematized all alterna-
tive ways of understanding democracy, history, and the rest of the world.”309
It proved so powerful that in 1996, a president whose election largely was
opposed by Reagan’s constituencies nevertheless similarly proclaimed:
“The era of big government is over.”310 Indeed, Bill Clinton advanced that
understanding so extensively that Posner has pronounced him “the consol-
idator of the Reagan revolution.”311
Pronouncements from presidents whose careers were so disparately
grounded politically provide indications of just how successfully the ideo-
logical narrative unifying them was constructed and advanced over the
course of the latter decades of the twentieth century. The roots of the rhetor-
ical strategies that drove the narrative began to come into focus as a forceful
reaction to successful public-interest activism of the 1960s.312 Regulatory
initiatives — advancing cleaner air, safer automobiles, better food labeling,
lending reform, and a broad range of other consumer protections — had not
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“intruded so emphatically on the business community’s patterns of opera-
tion” since the “trust-busting days of Theodore Roosevelt.”313 Concluding
that, as an executive of the National Association of Manufacturers put it,
“[l]egislators have tended to be more receptive to the public interest than
they might have been to business,” the business community began striving
more aggressively for greater collective influence on the legislative
process.314 If indeed, the regulatory activity had tilted excessively in favor
of protection of the fair-bargaining process and out of balance to freedom of
contract in the sixties, the tilt back would soon come with explosive force.
The numbers of Washington offices of Fortune 500 companies and corporate
political-action committees skyrocketed.315 By the end of seventies, there
were more individuals representing the interests of private industry work-
ing in Washington than there were federal employees.316
The unprecedented mobilization of business interests focused not only
on “virtual dominance of the legislative process in Congress”317 but also on
extensive rhetorical strategies asserting that business influence represented
the public interest more effectively. The period saw the rise of a body of lit-
erature known as “management theory,” a genre in which an “army of man-
agement theorists” holds forth “the corporation as the ideal vehicle for eco-
nomic democracy.”318 In 1972, more than 200 of the chief executive officers
from the nation’s largest corporations joined together to create the Business
Roundtable and express a unified political voice through lobbying of legis-
lators, campaign-finance spending through political-action committees, and
media activities designed to shape public opinion.320 John D. Harper, a
chairman of the Roundtable in the early seventies, said the organization
“launched a new-style political activism on several fronts” designed to curb
the influence of the public-interest movement and organized labor.321 “Less
than a decade later, all their objectives had been accomplished,” business
historian Scott Bowman concluded.322
It soon became commonplace to employ the rhetorical strategies that
took root during that time, strategies that quite consistently represented pro-
tection of the fair-bargaining process as subordinate to freedom of contract.
When the president of Pizza Hut was asked early in the twenty-first centu-
ry in a business-section interview about a bill introduced in the U.S.
Congress that would require fast-food restaurants to print nutritional infor-
mation on their menus, for example, his answer was formulated in such
terms: “This is an interesting debate, especially in a country like the United
States, that prides itself on individual freedom. What role does the govern-
ment play in mandating what people eat?” In that manner, similar questions
about proposed regulations on business activity were instantly reframed as
a threat of government taking away the freedoms of individual
Americans.323 The regulation in question in that example of course had
nothing to do with “mandating what people eat.” Indeed, providing greater
information for consumers would seem logically to suggestmore freedom of
choice, not less. But such rhetorical strategies, ideologically equating regu-
lation of business with loss of citizens’ freedom, would take such deep root
in the latter twentieth century as to become fixtures in political discourse.
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Rhetoric melding of the advancement of commercial interests with
mobilization efforts against endangered individual freedoms of course goes
back farther than the 1970s, as in Edward Bernays’ 1929 “torches of free-
dom” that linked the women’s rights movement with the American Tobacco
Company’s marketing efforts,324 or the “American Way” images from the
Depression-era campaign of the National Association of Manufacturers.325
Yet it was in the 1970s that the phenomenon could be seen to have gathered
force in more significant terms of broader ideological impact. Aggressively
advanced in media and legal discourses and aided favorably by events and
trends of that era, the interests of big business were more successfully than
ever before synthesized with core freedom values. The narrative power of
that effort to imbue the times with a sense of meaning and direction built
such momentum that as the seventies ended and the eighties began to
unfold, it had firmly taken root.
One of the most useful set of texts documenting discursive components
critical to the construction of the broader ideology can be found in the mas-
sive body of essays disseminated by the Mobil Oil corporation, most promi-
nently on the op-ed pages of The New York Times over the course of the
1970s. Those paid advocacy messages of Mobil’s, packaged on the editorial
pages of the newspaper similarly to the other opinions and commentaries
published there, represented an abundant body of business rhetoric focused
almost exclusively on efforts to influence political and social outcomes.
Although other corporations produced advocacy messages, Mobil spoke far
more regularly on other issues of public policy, inspiring a sharp rise in the
numbers and extensiveness of corporate advocacy campaigns. 326
Mobil waged that influential campaign with an ideological force and
consistency that broadly represented freedom of contract as essentially syn-
onymous with democracy. Variations on that theme had appeared before in
business discourse, seeking to address the widely held distrust of concen-
trated economic power that had been a part of the American psyche since
its founding. But no effort so compelling and comprehensive as Mobil’s had
ever been sustained. Mobil published op-ed messages in the Times on at
least 445 occasions between 1970 and 1980. Although more than half of the
company’s opinionated messages of that period dealt with issues related to
petroleum and various energy matters, a great many others addressed sepa-
rate subjects. Mobil was called “the champ of advocacy advertising” by
Fortune magazine and “the leading practitioner of ‘issue’ or ‘advocacy’
advertising” throughout the 1970s by Ad Forum. A 1978 Yankelovich,
Skelley, and White survey found that ninety percent of administration, con-
gressional, and other government officials read the Mobil op-ed ads.327 As a
public relations vehicle, Robert Heath’s 1997 assessment of Mobil as “the
most visible — and feistiest — corporate practitioner of advocacy commu-
nication” for the past quarter century is typical of its characterization in cor-
porate-advocacy literature.328
Beyond that realm, however, Mobil’s messages provided a prescient
vision of what lay ahead in American political culture, championing the
rise of a broader ideological narrative. In Mobil’s massive campaign, the cor-
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porate citizen was consistently and creatively represented as no different
from any other decent, hardworking, ordinary citizen, trying to go about its
business, but hounded incessantly by the destructive forces of government.
Thus, in that conceptualization, when human citizens reject government
regulation of corporate activity they are protecting themselves from govern-
ment persecution. Increasingly equating the interests of big business with
the interests of the people in its op-ed messages, Mobil pushed for citizens
to pressure legislators to free Americans from government interference with
business. When government threatened the rights of the corporation —
which was how Mobil invariably characterized regulatory efforts — it was
threatening the rights of individuals. “If some politicians won’t listen to rea-
son, perhaps they’ll listen to the people,” Mobil warned in one of its Times
spots, in language typical of its calls for action on its various causes. “What’s
needed now is a public outcry. Isn’t it time you spoke up? Your future may
depend on it.”329
In the 1970s Mobil was far from just another citizen but rather one of
the half-dozen largest oil companies in the world formed out of the divesti-
ture of parts of John D. Rockefeller’s gargantuan Standard Oil Trust after its
ordered breakup as an illegal monopoly was upheld by the Supreme Court
in 1911.330 Its campaign played out at a time in American history when
energy crises, declining productivity, and rising inflation were slowing the
U.S. economy.331 Political debate centered on what should be done to
resolve the tangle of dilemmas that dragged on through virtually the entire
decade. Mobil aggressively and unapologetically weighed in on the debate.
“When we began, advocacy, or ‘public issue’ advertising was … of rather
dubious legitimacy in some eyes,” Mobil noted. “That corporations had
ideas as well as products seemed to trouble a fair number of people.”332
Crucial to the brashness of the company’s approach was Herbert Schmertz,
a combative, articulate practitioner of public relations, who was named vice
president for public affairs at Mobil in 1969 and was elected to the board of
directors in 1976. Schmertz maintained there was no “fundamental differ-
ence between individuals and institutions” and advanced that belief as the
architect of the company’s advocacy campaign of the era.333
Mobil regularly replied to criticisms of its motives for seeking to influ-
ence public policy with depictions of what it declared to be the company’s
commitment to fostering democratic debate. The company contended that it
sought only “the right of the American people, all the people, to debate
freely and openly any issue that could have a pronounced effect upon their
lives.” It stated that legislators, government officials, and the press would
not supply vital information that corporate contributors like Mobil could
provide.334 “Mobil provokes, needles, challenges … to stir free-wheeling
dialogue in the public prints. Saying what we think needs saying on issues
that matter to people. Inflation. Jobs. Energy. Environment,” it declared.
“Voices of business balance other voices. Stifling any voice distorts the
democratic process.”335 That vision of the role of business in American
democracy would be synergized crucially with social and political forces
gathering momentum over the same period. When the 1970s had first begun
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to unfold, it had appeared American society might be ready to back anoth-
er significant wave of legislative reform of business, advancing greater gov-
ernment enforcement of the fair-bargaining process, as in the Progressive,
New Deal, and the 1960s. Instead, electoral majorities went on to repeated-
ly embrace candidates who espoused the central rhetoric of the pro-busi-
ness, anti-government, anti-regulatory ideology promoted by Mobil and
other business interests, powerfully tilting instead toward an imbalance that
more greatly favored freedom of contract.
A month before the November 1980 election, Mobil launched a series
of Times op-ed spots that in thinly veiled language called for voters to
change leadership in Washington and free big business, promising that the
energy crisis would be ended if Americans made the right choice: “The
choice between a safe degree of energy security and continued or increased
dependence on foreign oil depends on choices made by the American pub-
lic.”336 Mobil insisted, “Everything needed to meet increasing proportions
of higher energy demand with domestic supplies is available to us — every-
thing except appropriate government policy.”337 On the Thursday before the
Tuesday election, Mobil declared: “Our country has reached a point at
which fundamental energy decisions must be made — decisions that can
alter the course of history…. We believe the American people will respond
positively to this historic opportunity.”338 That election brought the tri-
umph of Ronald Reagan who more compellingly than any other would in
plain language synthesize the freeing of business interests from government
regulation with the protection of regular Americans’ liberty. As in Mobil
Oil’s campaign, he promised that the woes that plagued the nation in the
1970s could only be righted by making business more dominant in the polit-
ical equation.
The essence of Reagan’s core message was never distilled more purely
than the day he was first sworn in as president. Throughout that speech, the
rhetoric was phrased in terms of the way government robbed regular
Americans of their freedoms. “Our concern must be for a special interest
group that has been too long neglected…. They are, in short, ‘We the peo-
ple,’ this breed called Americans,” Reagan said.339 “It is time to check and
reverse the growth of government, which shows signs of having grown
beyond the consent of the governed…. It is no coincidence that our present
troubles parallel and are proportionate to the intervention and intrusion in
our lives that result from unnecessary and excessive growth of govern-
ment.”340
Over decades of making public speeches, first as a popular corporate
spokesperson for General Electric in the years leading to his political ascen-
dance and then in a variety of more direct political messages, Reagan had
perfected populist phrasing that ideologically advanced protection of the
fair-bargaining process as subordinate to freedom of contract. “It isn’t unfair
to say that today the world is divided between those who believe in the free
marketplace and those who believe in government control and ownership of
the economy,” he said in comments that broadly equated all government
regulation with the managed economies of socialist nations.341 Reagan’s
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calls for lowering corporate taxes were a recurrent cause in his speeches,
representing such taxes as impositions upon individual citizens. “Whether
it be corporation or corner store, taxes are part of business costs and must
be recovered in the price of the product. Meaning that all of us as consumers
pay those taxes,” he said. “Government can’t tax things like business or cor-
porations, it can only tax people.”342
Thus, Reagan represented government as playing no legitimate role in
balancing the fair-bargaining process. “Our problem is a permanent struc-
ture of government insulated from the thinking and wishes of the people….
Only you and I can change that. We must send congress a mandate to restore
government to the people.”343 Government regulation in the interests of cit-
izens was framed as an idealistic notion from the past that had outlived its
need. “Most of us have grown up thinking of government regulation as
designed to keep big business in its place…. That was the original idea,”
Reagan would tell audiences in order to set up his explanations of how mis-
guided such notions had grown.344 Such regulation actually was costing
Americans tens of billions of dollars annually in “administrative salaries
and overhead” and “increased prices — inflation if you will caused by
unnecessary regulations,” in Reagan’s refiguring of the relationship between
the governed and government regulation of business. That, he insisted,
called for reducing the influence of government in favor of a system in
which “the laws of the marketplace can replace useless regulations and cre-
ate real savings for consumers.”345
Such rhetoric closely paralleled that of corporate discourse such as
Mobil’s. “Government can become so pervasive that it becomes virtually
impossible for the citizenry to turn it around and change its course,” the
company declared in one of its New York Times advocacy messages. “But
it’s doubtful that business could ever get so big or so unresponsive, because
it is subject to reaction in the marketplace and to public opinion general-
ly.”346 Just how receptive an audience had developed for anti-government
rhetoric in many segments of American life was demonstrated by the stun-
ning early seventies success of Alabama Governor George Wallace, far
beyond the Old South. Reagan’s rhetoric of marketplace freedom pushing
back government interference offered a more palatable articulation of the
anti-government rage that had driven Wallace’s third-party presidential can-
didacy. It had Wallace dominating the Democratic Party primaries in 1972
when gunshot wounds suffered during a campaign appearance forced him
to withdraw. Yet he had presciently “sensed that millions of Americans felt
betrayed and victimized by the sinister forces of change” and would
respond strongly if given language for channeling their resentment, histori-
an Dan T. Carter wrote.347 Wallace drew roaring approval from crowds when
he told them that their nation had come under the control of an elite
opposed to the traditional values of patriotic, hardworking Americans, and
as he “neared the limits of his political popularity, he opened the door for
his successors to exploit the politics of anger.”348
The advancement of freedom of contract over all other societal con-
cerns represented a natural extension of marketing trends of the latter twen-
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tieth century. Such discursive strategies symbolically meshed with broader
popular narratives in which multinational corporations promoted them-
selves more vigorously than ever in human terms via consumer-friendly
personas such as Ronald McDonald, Mickey Mouse, the Michelin Man, the
Jolly Green Giant, and the Pillsbury Doughboy. Although the use of such
genial, appealing figures was not new by that time, it grew far more ubiqui-
tous and iconographic. The dynamics of such efforts complemented the rise
of “branding” in management theory, in which promotion of image took
precedence over production of goods.349 These trends coalesced with com-
pelling historical developments in ways that contributed to the success of
broader ideological agendas. Economic analyst Robert Kuttner wrote of it as
a “marketization” that began its ascendance in the 1970s and through which
“a new, radically classical economics gradually gained influence in the
academy and in politics.”350 James Arnt Aune described that influence in
terms of “economic correctness.”351 Kenneth S. Friedman characterized the
remarkable way the movement grew so widely entrenched as to represent “a
set of beliefs, comparable to religious beliefs in earlier ages, about the nature
of economics and societies.”352
That entrenchment contributed to a dramatic freeing of business activ-
ity from government restraint in the latter twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries. Watershed changes in law and policy loosened decades of
antitrust restrictions on corporate merger activity, unleashing a merger fren-
zy not seen since the late nineteenth century. Ultimately it made possible
such actions as the rejoining of Exxon and Mobil, the two largest pieces of
the old Standard Oil empire. The earlier public-interest legislative efforts of
the 1960s that had spawned big business’s collective backlash beginning in
the next decade were reversed many times over. Taxes on corporations were
slashed so extensively that by 2004 The Wall Street Journal declared: “It is
hard to see how the corporate tax tally could get much smaller.”353
Corporate taxes as a share of the national economy dropped to their lowest
level since World War II,354 at the same time that Standard & Poor’s report-
ed the cash reserves of the nation’s five hundred largest companies alone
topped $643 billion, a figure an S&P analyst called “out of whack with all
historical numbers.”355
Ideology rejecting any regulatory role in the fair-bargaining process
came to form the basis for policy making, as demonstrated, for example, by
an assertion in the early 2000s by an Environmental Protection Agency
administrator: “There is no environmental progress without economic pros-
perity.” Otherwise, he said while reducing ecological science to mere bot-
tom-line economics, “our capacity to make environmental gains is gone.”356
It proved a powerfully imbalancing mindset through which the lobbyists for
power companies, by many accounts, were bestowed with as considerable
control over environmental policy.357 The use of rhetorical strategies
designed to institutionalize such imbalance seemed boundless. From “tort
reform” to “death tax” to “the ownership society,” one campaign after
another advanced a broad understanding of greater freedom of contract as
far more beneficial to the interests of hard-working, ordinary citizens than
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any sort of government regulation.358
Even scientific findings were so extensively repackaged as to render
them more compatible with the agendas of big business that the Union of
Concerned Scientists issued a 2004 report — endorsed by more than six
thousand scientists — detailing the censoring and suppression of govern-
ment scientists, the stacking of advisory committees with unqualified polit-
ical appointees, and the disbanding of government panels that provided
undesired recommendations.359 Other accounts documented the way that
organizations such as the Global Climate Coalition and the Information
Council on the Environment were created by the petroleum, automotive,
coal, and other industries to develop campaigns repositioning global warm-
ing as theory rather than fact.360 Compounding such developments, it grew
increasingly more difficult for Americans to learn about such matters from
a free press, as more and more news media were reduced to subsidiaries of
business conglomerates where investigative reporting largely gave way to
entertainment, gossip, and punditry.361 Thus, by the first decade of the
twenty-first century, the rhetoric of “antiregulation and deregulation found
full expression, fueled by an ideology that markets know best, government
hampers markets, and problems will magically fix themselves.”362
Countless mechanisms for maintaining the fair-bargaining process had
given way to an expansionary favoring of freedom of contract in the broad-
est sweep of economic affairs imaginable.
The Hazards of Ideology Trumping Balance
The economic downturn of 2008 presented one stunning debacle after
another that fundamentally challenged the anti-regulation ideology. Both in
the immediate reporting of those dramatic events and in extensive analysis
that has followed, a dominant theme is the way that the ideological momen-
tum over preceding decades had led to the abandonment of so many histor-
ically grounded principles of business. The imbalance engendered through
that abandonment fostered widespread business practices built on an
assumption that preservation of the fair-bargaining process was no longer
necessary. The developments of 2008 brought, as financial reporter Andrew
Ross Sorkin has since described it, “a near collapse of the financial system,
forcing a government rescue effort with no precedent in modern history….
Wall Street had gone from celebrating its most profitable age to finding itself
on the brink of epochal devastation. Trillions of dollars in wealth had van-
ished.”363
As the mind-boggling collapse of markets and the global economy
began to unfold, day-to-day events challenged the certainty of recently dom-
inant ideological constructs with dizzying speed. Indeed, any number of
events from the latter months of the year — in and of themselves — stand
as fundamentally incompatible with such constructs. When the
Administration announced in early September that the federal government
was stepping in because months of efforts to find a private buyer for the
nation’s two largest mortgage finance companies had failed, the move was
described as “an extraordinary federal intervention in private enterprise ...
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[that] could become one of the most expensive financial bailouts in
American history.” Indeed, Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr., who
engineered the federal takeover of mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, “would not say how much capital the government might eventually
have to provide.”364 The nation had less than a week to grasp the news that
the business community could not save its two dominant mortgage finan-
ciers — while government ostensibly would be doing so — when it learned
that two of the largest securities firms on Wall Street were also negotiating
for government aid. Those talks concluded with the 158-year-old Lehman
Brothers going bankrupt and Merrill Lynch agreeing to be bought out to
avoid collapse, both due to massive losses from bad mortgage-finance and
real estate investments.365
Peter G. Peterson, who had formerly served as head of Lehman and as
secretary of commerce, called the developments “the most extraordinary
events I’ve ever seen.”366 Yet within days, news emerged that global insur-
ance giant American International Group (AIG) was also imploring the fed-
eral government to save it from a similar collapse.367 Desperate to avoid
another major corporate collapse, the government began pouring tens of bil-
lions of dollars into AIG.368 When Paulson called Congressional leaders
together to let them know that the government must assist AIG — because
no private firms were willing or able to do so — he considered the move so
unthinkable that he did not reveal the purpose of the meeting until after
they had gathered. When he told them the real reason for the meeting, an
aide to Paulson reported it left the legislators “petrified.”369
Executives and analysts pronounced the developments as epochal, pre-
dicting that banks would shrink, profits would decline, and jobs would
grow scarce.370 The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell to a seven-year low.371
Reports began to reveal just how disastrously the collapsed firms had been
managed in the age of minimalist regulation, as the staggering depth and
breadth of imprudent lending emerged.372 The American automobile indus-
try was next to turn to the federal government to save it from ruin.373 As cit-
izens sought to reconcile the incongruity of one business giant after anoth-
er suddenly no longer condemning government intervention in their affairs
but instead lining up to plead for as much of it as possible, still more omi-
nous developments began to come into focus.
The rapid series of collapses by major firms led multitudes of investors
to “frantically” pull their money from all but the safest of investments,
building toward a virtual shutdown of global credit markets.374 Over a time
span of a couple of weeks, government leaders found themselves quickly
moving beyond the already unimaginable steps of bailing out individual
corporate giants and on to a scramble to save the entire economic system
from falling apart.375 That fear led to the meeting that would have been
unimaginable only a short time before. On the afternoon of September 18,
Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke briefed President
George W. Bush that global markets were frozen and the situation so “extra-
ordinarily serious” that they wanted to ask Congress to authorize hundreds
of billions of dollars for the federal government to buy the troubled finan-
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cial assets that were sinking so many private companies. After hearing out
their proposal, Bush replied, “We need to do what it takes to solve this prob-
lem,” The Wall Street Journal reported.376 By “we,” he was referring to the
government. Another president of similar ideological bent may have
famously declared that “government is not the solution,” but now his polit-
ical heir was agreeing to sign off in dramatic fashion on precisely the oppo-
site proposition. President Bush’s decision set up a meeting that evening
with Congressional leaders, at which Paulson told them that if they did not
also authorize such a solution: “Then heaven help us all.”377
Those dire days led global billionaire financier George Soros to pro-
claim that “both Marxism and market fundamentalism are false ideolo-
gies.”378 The Wall Street Journal characterized the developments as “The
Week That Changed American Capitalism.”379 For it was not just that the
rhetoric of more than a quarter-century had been abandoned by some of that
rhetoric’s most prominent promulgators, it was also the dizzying speed with
which they were insisting the turnabout must be put into place. After
decades of rejecting virtually any role for government in business matters,
devout free-market ideologues were now demanding that government pump
out unprecedented public financing for private endeavors — and do so
immediately. President Bush and Treasury Secretary Paulson told Congress
that it must approve an almost incomprehensible $700 billion for their plan
within days in order to avert economic catastrophe — even though the plan
itself was not even completed.380 For the first time in his presidency,
President Bush delivered a prime-time televised address devoted exclusive-
ly to the economy. He appealed for support for the plan, which by then had
a name: TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program). Warning that failure to act
quickly could mean “a long and painful recession,” the president declared:
“Fellow citizens, we must not let this happen.”381
The sudden new role of government as solution, rather than problem
that the Administration had been conceptualized in Paulson’s proposal one
of virtual omnipotence was the ultimate in attempted reversal of imbalance.
A treasury secretary who only months before was still forcefully advocating
a highly limited role for government now called for a virtually unlimited
role for it. The original draft of the TARP stated: “Decisions by the Secretary
pursuant to the authority of this Act are non-reviewable and committed to
agency discretion, and may not be reviewed by any court of law or any
administrative agency.” Sorkin characterized the provision as vesting a sin-
gle government official “with perhaps the most incredible powers ever
bestowed on any one person over the economic and financial life of the
country.”382 Congress seemed unable to accept at first that such a wrench-
ing ideological contortion could be conceivable, and concern about the cost
generated enough opposition in the House of Representatives to defeat the
proposal in the first House vote on it.383 But after stock markets began
plunging even as the voting was taking place on C-SPAN — the Dow Jones
ultimately fell a record 777 points that day — fifty-nine members of the
House switched their votes and the plan won approval. Although some
changes were made through the legislative process, “lawmakers succeeded
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little in imposing control over use of the funds,” the Journal reported, “the
core of what Mr. Paulson requested survived largely unscathed.”384 Time
would show, however, that in fact such attempts at reversing the impact of
decades of imbalance overnight was not in reality possible.
The Journal called it “Black September, the biggest financial shock
since the Great Depression.”385 Alan Greenspan, whose deregulatory poli-
cies during his 19 years (1987-2006) as chairman of the Federal Reserve
were grounded in his faith in the self-correcting power of free markets, told
Congress in October of 2008 that he had been left “in a state of shocked dis-
belief” by recent developments. “This modern risk-management paradigm
held sway for decades,” he said. “The whole intellectual edifice, however,
collapsed.”386 Indeed, within just a few months time, “the shape of Wall
Street and the global financial system changed almost beyond recognition,”
Sorkin wrote. In addition to the five largest investment banks all failing,
being sold, or converted into a bank holding company, “with the stroke of a
president’s pen, the Treasury — and by extension, American taxpayers —
became part-owners in what were once the nation’s proudest financial insti-
tutions, a rescue that would have seemed unthinkable only months earli-
er.”387 As the initial shock of events has begun to recede into history, it has
been followed by extensive investigative reporting and economic and his-
torical analysis in which the most prominent theme underlying the events
of 2008 is the way that a fundamental imbalance in the fair-bargaining
process — ideologically spurred forward since the latter decades of the
twentieth century — contributed to the collapse that resulted.
Posner’s analysis of the crisis focuses on the decades-long trend toward
imbalance, particularly the way the “movement to deregulate the financial
industry went too far by exaggerating the resilience — the self-healing pow-
ers — of laissez-faire capitalism.”388 That imbalance was driven primarily
by such imprudent deregulation of the financial sector at the same time that
similarly short-sighted policy kept interest rates lower than warranted in a
“confluence of two dangerous developments” that led to excessive invest-
ment in relatively riskier investments by consumers, bankers, and other fin-
anciers.389 “The trends toward easy credit and deregulated and therefore
risky lending were mutually reinforcing,” Posner concluded, finding ideol-
ogy “played a role” in the “professional blindness” of most economists’
“inexcusable” failure “to have grasped the dangers that have now produced
the first U.S. depression since the 1930s.”390
Reporting on the economic crisis by veteran business journalists
described the ways that financial trends in the years leading up to it had
turned away from historically grounded principles of business toward prac-
tices that prioritized short-term gains. In a relatively short time, “Wall
Street’s business model had shifted from giving advice to taking on risk”
and money was made not through successful long-term investment but by
“weighing the odds and then making decisive, and massive, bets,” wrote
veteran business reporter Charlie Gasparino.391 Traditional business analy-
sis was discarded in favor of staggeringly complex computer models that
dismissed fundamentals such as “what a company actually made and
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whether it made it well.”392 Lessons learned and relearned over preceding
centuries concerned with greed and irrationality in market behavior were
abandoned for a blind faith in an absolute predictability offered by the new-
found methods of algorithmic analysis.393 Ultimately, when “possibly the
biggest, fastest, and strangest financial collapse ever seen” unfolded in
2008, “not one of the quants, despite their chart-topping IQs, … their
decades studying every statistical quirk of the market under the sun, saw the
train wreck coming.”394
Such abandonment of principles deeply grounded in historical experi-
ence characterized the reasoning that rose to dominance at one massive
financial institution after another. At lenders like Ameriquest, investment
houses like Lehman Brothers, and countless related entities, lending stan-
dards and underwriting were weakened to the point of nonexistence as “the
drive to increase loan volume trumped concerns about fraud,” found inves-
tigative journalist Michael W. Hudson.395 “Investors and regulators alike”
were sold “on the idea that it was possible, through accounting alchemy, to
turn risky assets into ‘Triple-A-related’ securities that were nearly as safe as
government bonds.”396 Wall Street traders persuaded government officials
to sign off on changes in law and policy that “gave rise to a mortgage-backed
securities market that was far more dysfunctional than anyone realized at
the time,” financial reporters Bethany McClean and Joe Nocera have docu-
mented.397 The belief that the financial verities of the ages had been some-
how repealed rippled so widely through society in the years preceding the
2008 crash that, particularly via aggressive promotion of “subprime lend-
ing” to countless borrowers whose credit records traditionally had made
them too risky for most lenders, home mortgages grew “preposterously easy
to get, with millions of Americans moving into luxury housing they could-
n’t afford and millions more using the bubble-addled housing prices to turn
their homes into personal ATMs” through refinancings and home-equity
loans.398 Under such conditions, almost any legitimate attempt at preserva-
tion of the fair-bargaining process was abandoned. Attorney and former
bank regulator William K. Black said that in some categories of the riskier
loans, ninety percent were found to involve fraudulent activity.399
In large part, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, established for more
than a century and a half and the fourth largest investment house in the
United States, continued to place bigger bets on the sustainability of such
unsustainable propositions.400 When “the great real estate bubble that
helped fuel growth in the financial sector for much of the decade” burst, it
also “mortally wounded” investment giant Merrill Lynch.401 A company
built over many years on a business model focused on restoring the faith of
small investors in the market after the Great Depression through prudent
investing had rapidly shifted into high-stakes investment banking in the
twenty-first century and doubled in size between 2005 and 2007.402 The col-
lapse of the mortgage-investment market brought Merrill Lynch down just
as rapidly, resulting in such massive losses that it had to agree to be
acquired by a similarly weakened Bank of America in a transaction that ulti-
mately required some $45 billion in assistance from the federal govern-
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ment.403
The process that over time produced such disregard for historically
grounded principles of sound business practice has been described as one
in which “a kind of public utility” focused on providing a generally reliable
flow of investment returns and lending options —much as the flow of water
and power are provided by other utilities — “drifted away from its core
intermediary function and morphed from utility to casino.”404 That meta-
morphosis of Wall Street “from a utility serving Main Street to a business
that took extraordinary risks to maximize its own profits at the expense of
that utility function set the stage for that crisis.”405 The transformation also
tilted the contentious balance between prudence and risk significantly away
from the stabilizing influence of risk managers. Though specialists of that
sort on Wall Street were “about as popular and welcome as a sensible
spouse or cautious bank manager whispering words of reason to a Vegas
gambler about to bet the ranch at blackjack,” they “knew instinctively or
had learned from experience that when it seemed as if nothing could go
wrong, it was time to look around for the hidden iceberg ready to rip a hole
in the side of the vessel.”406 As “Wall Street’s magical thinking” increasing-
ly denied such established verities in the years leading up to 2008, those
who persisted in urging measures of prudence “might be proven right in the
long run, but for now would be laughed at and shunned, and perhaps even
lose their jobs.”407
Such magical thinking seemed to have no bounds in that era. In writ-
ing about how the subprime lending industry actually collapsed when it
was much smaller in the late 1990s, financial journalist Michael Lewis —
himself once a bond trader— observed that the “market might have learned
a simple lesson: Don’t make loans to people who can’t repay them.”408 But
rather than that lesson, he found, “it learned a complicated one: You can
keep on making these loans, just don’t keep them on your books. Make the
loans, then sell them off to the fixed income departments of bit Wall Street
investment banks, which will in turn package them into bonds and sell
them to investors.”409 In that mentality, and the lack of regulation that
would have restrained it in the name of preserving the fair-bargaining
process, can be seen the way an absolute antithesis to any such preservation
had taken very deep root. “By early 2005 all the big Wall Street investment
banks were deep into the subprime game,” Lewis wrote.410 Within a few
more years, such practices had expanded imprudent lending far beyond
subprime borrowers to by some estimates half of all mortgages made during
that period. “Insolvent borrowers meant insolvent lenders, insolvent
builders, and insolvent hedge funds,” adding up to “an insolvency crisis
that would affect the U.S. and the wider global economy.”411 Through that
process, the undermining of the fair-bargaining process itself was in effect
securitized exponentially as the considerable risks were distributed out
upon the countless parties involved in the complex web of mortgage trans-
actions, most of whom were neither provided nor had the level of financial
acumen necessary to understand the level of that risk.412 Even among those
who did understand it, few were able to escape the devastation. “In some
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ways, Wall Street was undone by its own smarts, as the very complexity of
mortgage-backed securities meant that almost no one was able to figure out
how to price them in a declining market,” Sorkin has concluded.413
In the context of this monograph’s greater focus, the concern here is not
with assessment of the role that any particular institution or policy in and
of itself played in the economic crisis. Rather it is with the disproportionate
influence that ideological certainty in boundless risk played in the buildup
to the economic crisis, which critically serves to illustrate how such lack of
balance undermines historically grounded principles of sound business
practice. The normal activities of investment houses — and other business-
es to varying degrees — involve inherent risk: “If a sensible risk-balanced
culture prevails, an investment bank can be a profitable money machine,
but an insensible risk-balanced culture leads to disaster, as Lehman discov-
ered.”414 Whereas, companies “that balance the tug-of-war between risk and
return … in the long run, are more profitable,” risk-management analyst
Mark T. Williams has detailed, when the “leveraged real estate boom
screeched to a halt, and Lehman was stuck holding billions of dollars of
junk loans,” it suddenly became “an overloaded elephant walking on thin
ice.”415 What was missing most of all was maintenance of balance between
freedom of contract and protection of the fair-bargaining process. For it is
precisely that balance between the two that Justice Powell’s core principles
and much historical wisdom holds forth as the optimal theoretical founda-
tion for the adjudicating commercial speech doctrine, as well as for manag-
ing economic affairs more broadly. “Unchecked, Wall Street will always
seek the highest profit and ignore many risks. Conversely, excessive govern-
ment intervention will stifle bank profitability, vital economic growth, and
prosperity,” Williams wrote.416
Economic events such as those that unfolded in 2008, cataclysmic as
they were for those who lived through them, are lessons that citizens have
experienced throughout history. “Speculative excess … and revulsion from
such excess in the form of a crisis, crash, or panic can be shown to be if not
inevitable, at least historically common,” wrote economist Charles P.
Kindleberger in his classic history of the phenomenon.417 As financial his-
torian Peter L. Bernstein concluded in his history of risk, “The goal of wrest-
ing society from the mercy of the laws of chance continues to elude us.”418
Yet the theoretical justification for balance will always face the undermin-
ing of ideology and technology tempting us to believe otherwise, and it will
always be under assault from the opposing camps. “The position that mar-
kets generally work but occasionally break down,” as Kindleberger put it,
“is widely at variance with the views at either of two extremes: that … mar-
kets work perfectly in all times and places, or that they work badly and
should be replaced by planning and governmental assignments.”419
As discussed previously, the excessive ideological abandonment of reg-
ulatory balance and prudence that rose to dominance beginning in the
1970s was itself generated in response to imbalance in the other direction
in the preceding era. Justice Powell in his memorandum for the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce in 1971 had indeed been part of the call for such a
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response.420 And yet his time at the Court was characterized not solely by
efforts to tilt the balance in favor of one interest over others but by indis-
putable efforts to establish an enduring mechanism of jurisprudence that
would maintain balance over time. His Hudson-centric commercial speech
doctrine represents his most lasting achievement of that determination to
establish doctrinal balance. The Powellian balance served that purpose well
over time, maintaining a difficult equilibrium over the course of a series of
complex First Amendment cases between the freedom of the informational
component of advertising and the fair-bargaining process implicated in the
contractual component of such speech. The value of balance in general may
seem self-evident, yet it clearly is not so paramount that it cannot be exces-
sively devalued through the sort of ideological ascendance in rhetoric and
practice that extensive analysis finds contributed significantly to the eco-
nomic crisis of 2008. And similarly, one sees in the debate on commercial
speech and First Amendment protection many competing ideological efforts
to tilt it away from the sort of balance that the Hudson-centric commercial
speech doctrine has institutionalized in related jurisprudence for more than
three decades.
Conclusion
It is illustrative that Justice Powell — whose career background and
well-documented agenda before joining the Supreme Court arguably made
him the most experientally business-oriented justice there in recent decades
— demonstrated such a deep commitment to balancing competing interests
in the commercial speech doctrine. As a corporate attorney before joining
the Court who perceived a state of imbalance in terms of business influence
on American society in the early 1970s, he authored his vigorous “Attack”
memorandum calling for a rectifying of that imbalance. But it would
become clear over the course of his work on the commercial speech doctrine
that it was, above all, balance itself that he ultimately prioritized — rather
than excessively advantaging business interests over all other societal con-
cerns. That effort markedly strove to resist tilting that body of jurisprudence
toward either totally unrestrained freedom of the informational component
of advertising or excessively suppressive enforcement of the fair-bargaining
process implicated in the contractual component of such speech. Both
Justice Powell and majorities of Supreme Court justices in the formative
body of rulings on First Amendment protection for advertising repeatedly
affirmed the value of finding balance — however difficult that might be
from case to case.
Those who argue that the Hudson test produces conflicting results are
missing the point that it is intended to produce results that may indeed
seem conflicting when not examined closely. In actuality, it derives from the
test’s overriding objective of balance. As the Court has demonstrated in sev-
eral of its more recent commercial speech cases,421 the Hudson test can be
the basis for both upholding regulation on commercial speech (such as “do
not call” restrictions on telemarketing422 and lottery advertising)423 and for
striking down regulations on advertising (such as those involving alcohol
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content,424 prices,425 and tobacco billboards).426 Despite arguments by some
justices against maintaining the centricity of Central Hudson, and even
when the Court has been specifically petitioned in recent commercial
speech cases to abandon that centricity,427 the majority has firmly rejected
the justification for doing so: “We see ‘no need to break new ground. Central
Hudson, as applied in our more recent commercial speech cases, provides
an adequate basis for decision.’”428
In its fundamental effort to balance between complex competing inter-
ests, the facts of any particular case can justify a result that will favor — in
that case, at least — either greater freedom of the informational component
of advertising or advancement of contractual component preserving the fair-
bargaining process. But over time, neither of those components will assume
a disproportionate influence in the greater body of case law on commercial
speech adjudicated under the Hudson-centric doctrine. As this analysis has
asserted, such a judgment is philosophically consistent with a balance in
economic affairs more broadly between freedom of contract and the fair-bar-
gaining process. These extremes are in contrast to the ideologically driven
imbalance that characterized economic affairs more broadly in the decades-
long buildup to the economic crisis of 2008. The modern Supreme Court’s
modern, Hudson-centric commercial speech doctrine’s grounding in such
philosophical underpinnings provides extensive support for understanding
it as consistent with historical principles of sound business law, experience,
and practice.
The essential elements of the Powell Era Court’s commercial speech
jurisprudence have remained in place over more than three decades, despite
an array of criticism in some branches of the literature and by forceful argu-
ments against it by some justices. This monograph asserts that its hardiness
in the face of such formidable challenges — and the stark and stunning con-
trast presented by the lessons of recent ideological imbalance’s shaping
influence on broader economic activity — can be attributed to its anchoring
in a broader, time-tested wisdom on how to best promote vital and complex
societal interests.
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